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Concluding this volume on children’s cognition, this
chapter addresses developmental changes in cognition that extend beyond childhood. I will not trace cognitive change across the entire span of adulthood (for
lifespan accounts, see Cerella, Rybash, Hoyer, & Commons, 1993; Commons, Richards, & Armon, 1984;
Craik & Salthouse, 1993; Holliday & Chandler, 1986;
Hoyer & Rybash, 1994; Kausler, 1994; Lachman &
Burack, 1993; Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994; Rybash,
Hoyer, & Roodin, 1986; Sinnott & Cavanaugh, 1991).
Rather, I highlight changes associated with the second
(and to a lesser extent the third) decade of life. The re-

search reviewed suggests that developmental changes in
cognition, at least in some individuals, continue at least
through adolescence and early adulthood.
In the opening sections of the chapter, I address a variety of historical, theoretical, and methodological considerations regarding advanced cognitive development.
I then argue that the central locus of developmental change in cognition beyond childhood is in reasoning—that is, in the deliberate application of epistemic
constraints to one’s own thinking. Three forms of reasoning—case-based, law-based, and dialectical—are distinguished and developmental research relevant to each
947
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is reviewed. Finally, I attempt to explain advanced cognitive development by proposing a metacognitive, constructivist, and pluralist conception of human rationality.

HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF
ADVANCED COGNITION
Formal Reasoning
Explicit conceptions about the nature of sophisticated
reasoning and logic date back at least to Plato and Aristotle. The psychological study of advanced cognitive development can be traced to James Mark Baldwin (1895),
who postulated a “hyper-logical” stage of mental development in which
syllogistic forms come to have an independent or a
priori force, and pure thought emerges—thought,
that is, which thinks of anything or nothing. The
subject of thought has fallen out, leaving the shell
of form. (1930, p. 23; cited in Cairns, 1983)
In a similar vein, Piaget (1924/1972) presented early
evidence that “formal reasoning” begins to be seen about
the age of 11 or 12. By formal reasoning, Piaget meant
“formal deduction,” which
consists in drawing conclusions, not from a fact
given in immediate observation, nor from a judgment which one holds to be true without any
qualiﬁcations (and thus incorporates into reality
such as one conceives it), but in a judgment which
one simply assumes, i.e. which one admits without
believing it, just to see what it will lead to. (p. 69)
Piaget was clear that logical deduction could be seen in
children as young as age 7 or 8, but insisted that such
deduction “bears only upon the beliefs which the child
has adopted himself ” (p. 67). It is only at age 11 or 12,
he suggested, that reasoning becomes “hypothetico-deductive” (p. 69). Formal reasoning, in Piaget’s conception, enables the adolescent to reason strictly about hypotheses in a constructed realm of possibility that is
explicitly distinguished from empirical reality. “To be
formal,” he proposed, “deduction must detach itself
from reality and take up its stand upon the plane of the
purely possible, which is by deﬁnition the domain of
hypothesis” (p. 71).
Baldwin’s theory and the early work of Piaget notwithstanding, the study of cognitive development beyond childhood remained relatively sparse and atheoret-
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ical. When Horrocks (1954) wrote what was intended
as a comprehensive chapter on “The Adolescent” for
the second edition of the present handbook, he devoted barely one page to “Intellectual Growth and Development.” Drawing on a quantitative conception of
intelligence associated with the psychometric tradition,
Horrocks’ review of adolescent cognitive development
focused exclusively on the “rate of mental growth” and
the age at which such growth ceased. His conclusion was
that mental growth slows dramatically over the course of
adolescence and that “in terms of mental ability or power
the adolescent is nearing his peak” (p. 719).
Piaget’s Theory of Formal Operations
The year after Horrocks’ review, Inhelder and Piaget
(1955/1958) published their classic The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence, the ﬁrst fulllength treatment of cognitive development beyond
childhood. The book presented detailed accounts of performance by children and adolescents on a variety of ingenious tasks designed and administered by Inhelder
and her associates; as well as an ambitious theoretical effort by Piaget to characterize and explain the observed
developmental changes.
Methodologically, the 15 studies reported in The
Growth of Logical Thinking each involved some sort of
physical apparatus—ﬂexible rods, a pendulum, an inclined plane, communicating vessels, a hydraulic press,
or a balance scale. Children ranging in age from 5
through 16 were encouraged to manipulate the materials and to construct an understanding of the associated
physical phenomena—for example, the eﬀect of potentially relevant variables on the relative ﬂexibility of the
rods or on the rate of oscillation of the pendulum. They
were interviewed individually about their experiments
and conclusions. As in both prior (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1951/1975) and subsequent (e.g., Piaget, 1987) research, responses were interpreted as revealing patterns
of thinking that were common among adolescents, but
rarely or never seen prior to age 11.
In many respects, Piaget’s account of these results was
continuous with his earliest theorizing about adolescent
cognition. Formal thinking, he argued
is essentially hypothetico-deductive. By this we mean
that the deduction no longer refers directly to perceived realities but to hypothetical statements—i.e., it
refers to propositions which are formulations of hypotheses or which postulate facts or events independently of whether or not they actually occur. (p. 251)
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The emphasis on the hypothetical involves a radical
reconstruction of the perceived relation between realities
and possibilities. That is,
in formal thought, there is a reversal of the direction
of thinking between reality and possibility in the subjects’ method of approach. Possibility no longer appears merely as an extension of an empirical situation
or of actions actually performed. Instead, it is reality
that is now secondary to possibility. (p. 251, emphases
in original)

Thus, Piaget continued to emphasize the importance
of formal or hypothetico-deductive reasoning in adolescence. Such reasoning, he argued, is central to formulating a logically coherent realm of possibilities. The formulation of such a realm, in turn, was seen as central to
a sophisticated understanding of reality. That is, reality
can best be understood within the context of possibility. Formal understanding, moreover, involves “reﬂective thinking” (p. 342), including critical analysis of one’s
own thinking and the deliberate construction of theories
that systematize one’s ideas.
By 1955, however, Piaget was consolidating the most
structural phase of his career. Having proposed a set of
operational structures to explain the reasoning of middle childhood, he now saw the transition to adolescence
as involving the construction of second-order, or formal,
operations involving transformations of ﬁrst-order, or
concrete, operations. At a still more technical level, formal operations were characterized as an ensemble des parties or “structured whole” (p. xix, note 18), involving (a) a
“complete combinatorial system” with the logico-mathematical properties of a lattice and (b) the coordination
of two forms of reversibility—inversion and reciprocity—within the Identity-Negation-Reciprocity-Correlative (INRC) Group. In eﬀect, Piaget postulated a version of propositional logic as the structure underlying
formal operational reasoning (Smith, 1987). Although
Piaget had earlier sketched a structural account of adolescent cognition as “formal operations” (1947/1960, pp.
147–150), The Growth of Logical Thinking was notable for
a substantial elaboration of his structural theory. Thus,
the theory of formal reasoning became the theory of formal operations (De Lisi, 1988).
Inhelder and Piaget’s qualitative account of adolescent cognition as structurally distinct from childhood
cognition revolutionized the study of adolescent cognitive development. By the 1970s, a substantial body
of literature concerning Piaget’s theory of formal operations had emerged. (For a classic Piagetian review, see
Neimark, 1975; for an early critical review, see Keating,
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1980; for more recent critiques and reformulations, see
Braine & Rumain, 1983; Byrnes, 1988a, 1988b; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Gray, 1990; Halford, 1989; Keating, 1988, 1990; Smith, 1987.) In recent years, the literature on cognitive development in adolescence and
beyond has increasingly transcended the theory of formal operations and branched oﬀ in multiple directions.
The issues highlighted by Piaget, however, continue to
set much of the agenda for research and theory.

DOES COGNITION DEVELOP BEYOND
CHILDHOOD?
Piaget’s theory claims that (a) developmental changes
in cognition continue through early adolescence and
(b) the cognitive structure associated with early adolescence, formal operations, is the ﬁnal stage of development. Both claims are open to question. On one hand,
extensive evidence of early cognitive competence (DeLoache, Miller, & Pierroutsakos, this volume; R. Gelman & Williams, this volume; S. Gelman & Wellman,
this volume) raises the possibility that the most fundamental aspects of cognition emerge very early; later cognitive changes, it might be argued, are not developmental in nature. On the other hand, a number of theorists
have proposed forms of advanced cognition that, they
suggest, develop in late adolescence or adulthood (Commons et al., 1984; Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994). Thus,
Piaget’s theory is challenged both by claims that cognitive development is limited to childhood, and by claims
that it extends beyond adolescence.
In order to address the fundamental question of
whether cognition develops beyond childhood, we must
consider what we mean by development. Perhaps the
paradigm case of a developmental change associated
with adolescence is puberty, the transition to sexual maturity. It may be useful to consider what characteristics
of this change lead us to construe it as developmental
in nature. One obvious characteristic is that puberty is
a long-term change. It occurs over a period of months
or years, rather than minutes, hours, or days. Three additional characteristics appear worthy of note:
1. Puberty is a qualitative change. It involves a coordinated transformation of anatomical and physiological
systems resulting in a structurally distinct state of maturity. In contrast, increasing some number of inches
in height is not a qualitative transformation. Mere
growth is not a core example of development.
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2. Puberty is a progressive change. It has a natural direction that constitutes progress toward a state of maturity. A transition involving a loss of reproductive
capacity, by contrast, might be an equally important
change, but would be less likely to be construed as
prototypically developmental in nature.
3. Puberty is an internally-directed change. Although it
requires environmental support (e.g., adequate nutrition), it is not caused or directed by the environment.
On the contrary, the transition to sexual maturity is
typically seen as genetically guided and universal
across the species.
It is widely accepted among biologists that certain
long-term anatomical and physiological changes, such
as puberty, are qualitative, progressive, and internally-directed to a suﬃcient extent that such changes are usefully construed as falling into a category of change that
may be labeled developmental change. Substantial evidence has led many psychological theorists to posit
long-term cognitive changes that, like puberty, are suﬃciently qualitative, progressive, and internally-directed to
be usefully construed as developmental in nature (Case,
Ch. 15, this Volume; Valsiner, Volume 1).
Even if cognition does develop, there remains the
question of whether such development continues beyond
childhood. A negative answer to that question would
make this a very short chapter. I hope to demonstrate in
this section the plausibility of a positive answer but raise
the possibility that cognitive development beyond childhood diﬀers in important ways from prototypical examples of development such as puberty.
Qualitative Change
At the historical and theoretical core of the theory of
formal operations is the postulation of a qualitative shift
to formal reasoning competence at about age 11 or 12
(De Lisi, 1988; Piaget, 1924/1972). Research on hypothetico-deductive reasoning has provided substantial evidence for such a qualitative transformation at about this
age (Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Moshman & Franks,
1986). A number of more recent theories also postulate
qualitative changes in cognition beyond childhood. As
we will see later in this chapter, there is substantial evidence for the existence of types, forms, or levels of cognition that are common among adolescents and adults,
but rarely seen much before the age of 11 (Basseches,
1980, 1984; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Case, Ch. 15,
this Volume; Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Commons et
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al., 1984; Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; King & Kitchener, 1994; Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Kohlberg, 1984;
Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988; Lamborn, Fischer, & Pipp, 1994; Marini & Case, 1994; Markovits, 1993; Markovits, Schleifer, & Fortier, 1989; Markovits & Vachon, 1989, 1990; Moshman, 1990, 1993,
1995b; Moshman & Franks, 1986; O’Brien, 1987; Overton, 1990; Overton, Ward, Noveck, Black, & O’Brien,
1987; Ward & Overton, 1990).
It is far less clear whether there is a general and/or
structural aspect to such change and, if so, how such
generality and/or organization is best characterized. If
change is general across domains, are qualitative shifts in
multiple domains of cognition simultaneous, or at least
highly correlated? Are there one or more abstract structures of cognition that can be applied, perhaps with a
greater or lesser degree of success, to these domains?
The most inﬂuential candidate for a very general form
of cognitive structure has been Piaget’s conceptualization of formal operations. As we have seen, the theory
of formal operations goes beyond Piaget’s early postulation of a qualitative shift to formal reasoning by postulating a highly abstract logico-mathematical structure
that forms the basis for a general stage of cognitive development. This proposal has been highly controversial
(for diverse views, see Braine & Rumain, 1983; Byrnes,
1988a, 1988b; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Gray, 1990;
Halford, 1989; Keating, 1980, 1988, 1990; Neimark,
1975; Smith, 1987). Even if the theory does provide an
adequate account of some forms of reasoning, moreover, it is doubtful that it can fully account for the multiple forms of advanced cognition to be discussed in this
chapter (Basseches, 1984; Broughton, 1977; Campbell
& Bickhard, 1986; Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Commons et al., 1984; Kitchener & Kitchener, 1981; PierautLe Bonniec, 1980).
A central theoretical and methodological issue in efforts to identify and characterize structural transformation is the fact that qualitatively distinct forms of
thought and knowledge routinely coexist in the same
mind (Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995;
Schauble, 1996; Wark & Krebs, 1996). It often seems
reasonable to speak of a qualitative shift when an important new form of cognition appears, even if that
form does not completely supplant earlier forms. The
appropriate criteria for structural change, however, are
much less clear. Some researchers attempt to address
this problem via methodologies that highlight underlying competence (Overton, 1990) or optimal level of
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functioning (Lamborn et al., 1994) rather than typical behavior. Such methodologies often do yield evidence for general age-related limits on performance
(Case, Ch. 15, this Volume; Marini & Case, 1994), but
it remains unclear in what sense there might be general
and/or structural change in later cognitive development
(Wark & Krebs, 1996).
In sum, there do appear to be cognitive changes of a
qualitative nature beyond childhood. The generality and
organization of such changes, however, are matters of
dispute.
Progressive Change
Another characteristic of developmental change is that
it is progressive (R. Kitchener, 1986). With respect to
puberty, it is fairly easy to specify a universally achieved
state of sexual and reproductive maturity and to assess
progress toward that state. With respect to cognition,
a variety of formulations concerning the nature of maturity have been put forward. The best-known proposal
concerning a state of cognitive maturity is Piaget’s account of formal operations. Other theorists have proposed alternative general conceptions of cognitive maturity (Commons et al., 1984). Riegel (1973) and Basseches
(1980, 1984), for example, proposed dialectical thinking
as a general, post-formal, and ﬁnal stage of cognitive development. Finally, some theorists have suggested domain-speciﬁc conceptions of cognitive maturity. Kohlberg (1984) posits a highest stage of moral development
involving an ultimate level of abstract perspective taking.
King and Kitchener (1994), to take another example, describe a highest stage in the development of reﬂective
judgment, involving sophisticated conceptions of knowledge and justiﬁcation.
Although the existence of a developmental endpoint would indicate the progressive nature of cognitive changes in the direction of that endpoint, the existence of such an endpoint is not a necessary condition
for progressive change. Formal operational reasoning,
for example, is a second-order structure that includes
and transcends the ﬁrst-order structure of concrete operations; the transition from concrete to formal operations can thereby be construed as progress, regardless of
whether formal operations is a ﬁnal stage. Similarly, the
emergence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning may be
seen as an expansion of the domain of deductive reasoning that constitutes progress, regardless of whether
hypothetico-deductive reasoning is, or leads to, some
sort of highest stage. Along the same lines, although
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stage theories such as those of Selman (1980), Kohlberg
(1984), and King and Kitchener (1994) typically posit a
highest stage, one can often make a strong case for each
stage representing progress over the stage before without demonstrating that each stage increasingly approximates a mature state yet to come. Such a case might
be made, for example, by showing that the later stage is
more diﬀerentiated, integrated, organized, metacognitive, reﬂective, and/or adaptive (Campbell & Bickhard,
1986; Valsiner, Ch. 4, Volume 1).
Cross-sectional research suﬃces to demonstrate that
some forms of cognition typically appear later than
others. Longitudinal and cross-cultural evidence may
strengthen the case that certain developmental sequences
are invariant across individuals and cultures (Boyes &
Walker, 1988; Kohlberg, 1984; Snarey, 1985). To make
the case for cognitive progress, however, requires a demonstration that later cognitions are in some sense better,
an epistemological claim that cannot be supported simply on the basis of empirical evidence. A key issue in the
study of cognitive progress, then, is the theoretical coordination of empirical and epistemological considerations
(R. Kitchener, 1986; Piaget, 1985; Smith, 1993).
As we will see throughout this chapter, a strong case
can be made for progressive changes in cognition during adolescence and early adulthood. The existence of
mature cognitive states, however, and the nature of
any such developmental endpoints, remain matters of
dispute.
Internally Directed Change
Finally, there is the question of whether cognitive transitions beyond childhood are internally directed. The most
obvious sense in which a change may be internally directed is that it is guided by the genes. Many of the most
important genetically guided changes with respect to
anatomy and physiology are universal across the species.
Research on young children has led many theorists to
the view that early cognitive development is to a large
degree guided by innate constraints that are universal
across individuals and cultures (Gelman & Williams,
Ch. 12, this Volume; Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 1992; Spelke &
Newport, Ch. 6, Volume 1). Nevertheless, it does not
follow that cognitive change is directed or determined
by genes; any such conclusion would be especially dubious with respect to later cognitive transitions.
There is another sense, however, in which cognitive
change might be said to be internally directed. A constructivist view of cognition posits an epistemic subject
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or rational agent actively constructing new knowledge
and forms of thinking on the basis of his or her own
perceptions and reasons. Although the constructive activities of such a subject are not genetically determined,
they are nonetheless internal to the rational agent, rather
than caused by the environment. Without positing either genetic determinism or universality across the species, a constructivist conception does suggest an important sense in which cognitive change is internally
directed (Bidell, Lee, Bouchie, Ward, & Brass, 1994;
Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 1992; R.
Kitchener, 1986; Moshman, 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Piaget,
1985; Smith, 1993).
One useful approach to investigating the internallydirected nature of change is microgenetic research, in
which subjects are observed over a period of time in a
rich task environment to see how they construct and apply skills that are not directly taught (Schauble, 1990,
1996). Kuhn et al. (1995), for example, studied changes
in the coordination of theories and evidence by children
and adults over a series of ten sessions. They found progress in the ability to coordinate theories and evidence despite the absence of direct teaching, suggesting an innerdirected process of change. The fact that both children
and adults made substantial progress in a relatively short
period of time suggests a constructive process rather
than a genetically based process of maturation.
Cross-cultural research provides another avenue for
identifying changes that are not simply instilled by particular environments (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Snarey,
1985). Outside the realm of moral cognition, however,
cross-cultural research on advanced cognitive development is rare.
As we will see, a strong theoretical and empirical case
can be made for long-term cognitive changes that are
internally directed. At advanced levels, however, there is
no evidence that any such changes are genetically driven,
and it is unclear what internally directed changes, if any,
are universal across the species.
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, we will see evidence for cognitive changes beyond childhood suﬃciently like puberty
to be labeled “developmental.” Our core conception of
development comes from the realm of biology, however,
and may be misleading in the realm of cognition. We
should not assume that everything we might call cognitive development has all those characteristics that lead
us to construe puberty as a developmental change. As
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we will see, it appears that there are indeed long-term
changes in cognition that are qualitative, progressive,
and internally directed; some such changes, moreover,
continue into adolescence and beyond. It is doubtful
that late cognitive changes are genetically driven, however. It remains unclear, moreover, in what respects, if
any, advanced cognitive changes are structural, general
across domains, aimed at one or more speciﬁc endpoints,
or universal across persons and cultures (Hoyer & Rybash, 1994; Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994; Rybash et al.,
1986). These are questions to which we will return.

FROM INFERENCE TO REASONING
Cognition is generally construed to be inferential in that
it routinely goes beyond the data at hand. In the present
section, I will: (a) deﬁne thinking as an advanced form
of inference; (b) deﬁne reasoning as an advanced form
of thinking; (c) consider the speciﬁcity and generality of
reasoning; and (d) suggest that reasoning is the primary
locus of late developmental changes in cognition.
From Inference to Thinking
Inference may be deﬁned as the generation of new cognitions from old. Inferential processing is central to most
areas of human cognition and is typically automatic
and unconscious. Reading, for example, routinely involves inferences that go beyond the text (Lea, O’Brien,
Fisch, Noveck, & Braine, 1990). Similarly, eﬀective social interaction involves an ongoing stream of inferences
about the moods, meanings, and intentions of those with
whom we interact (Hilton, 1995).
Thinking may be deﬁned as the deliberate coordination of one’s inferences to serve one’s purposes (Moshman, 1995a). We think, for example, in order to solve a
problem, make a decision, plan a project, justify a claim,
or test a hypothesis. Thus deﬁned, thinking is not limited
to late development, nor does it ever replace elementary inference. Young children think, and adults continue
to make automatic and unconscious inferences. Nevertheless, the emergence of thinking represents an important advance in the nature and use of inference. Research shows development at least through adolescence
in problem solving (Foltz, Overton, & Ricco, 1995), decision making (Byrnes & McClenny, 1994; Furby &
Beyth-Marom, 1992), planning (Lachman & Burack,
1993; Scholnick & Friedman, 1993), hypothesis testing
(Kuhn et al., 1988), and other types of thinking.
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From Thinking to Reasoning
Because thinking is purposeful, an act of thinking may
be evaluated with respect to how well it serves the purposes of the thinker. Over the course of development,
thinkers increasingly make such evaluations themselves
and attempt to improve their inferential activities. Recognizing that some thought processes are more justiﬁable than others, they increasingly construct standards of
rationality and apply these to their own thinking. To the
extent that an individual attempts to constrain his or her
thinking on the basis of a self-imposed standard of rationality, we may say the individual is engaged in reasoning. Reasoning, then, is epistemologically self-constrained thinking (Moshman, 1995a).
Consider, for example, developmental changes in decision making. At a primitive level, an individual might
pursue a course of action on the basis of available information without any intent to select from two or more
options or awareness of having done so. A psychologist
studying this cognitive process might determine what
inferences the individual made and might evaluate the
adequacy of those inferences, but it would be misleading
to say the individual has made a decision.
At a more advanced level, an individual understands
that there are two or more options available, makes a
series of inferences intended to determine the best option, and then consciously chooses that option. Such
decision making may be usefully regarded as an act of
thinking.
Research suggests that for at least some individuals,
the quality of decision making continues to improve at
least through adolescence (Byrnes & McClenny, 1994).
A plausible explanation for this is: Over the course of
development, individuals become increasingly successful
in constraining their inferences to conform to increasingly justiﬁable norms. Some such norms may be speciﬁc to making decisions, whereas others may be applicable to multiple types of thinking.
At least three general forms of reasoning—to be discussed in the next three sections of this chapter—may
play roles in decision making and other types of thinking. First, the decision maker may purposely choose the
option most similar to one that has been successful in
the past. This is analogical reasoning, a type of casebased reasoning. Second, the decision maker may deliberately constrain his or her inferences to conform to
rules of logic or other epistemic laws. Such law-based
reasoning is the focus of extensive developmental theory
and research. Finally, the decision maker may move pro-
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gressively toward a decision via some form of dialectical
reﬂection or argumentation.
Developmental changes in problem solving may similarly reﬂect the emergence and application of epistemic
self-constraints. Foltz et al. (1995), for example, assessed
ﬁfth- and eighth-graders on formal logical reasoning and
presented each with a problem involving identiﬁcation
of a hidden ﬁgure. Formal reasoning competence was
associated with the use of deductive proof construction
strategies that enabled more eﬃcient problem solving by
avoiding the generation of redundant information.
This theoretical approach to thinking and reasoning
has important methodological implications. Given the
proposed deﬁnitions, an automatic inference is not an
act of thinking and does not constitute reasoning, even
if the inference conforms to logical, mathematical, or
other epistemic norms. Correspondingly, a deliberate effort to constrain one’s thinking on the basis of what one
believes to be justiﬁable epistemic norms constitutes reasoning, even if the norms are not successfully applied or
are demonstrably inappropriate. Bad reasoning, in this
view, is still reasoning, whereas good inferences do not
necessarily involve reasoning at all.
In assessing reasoning, then, it is not suﬃcient to present a task and see if subjects reach the logically or mathematically proper conclusion. Such an approach will overestimate reasoning competence in cases where automatic
inferences suﬃce to reach the approved conclusion; it
will underestimate reasoning competence in cases where
deliberate eﬀorts to constrain thinking do not suﬃce to
generate the approved conclusion. As we will see, these
are important considerations in attempting to reconcile
the extensive literatures purporting to demonstrate logical, mathematical, and scientiﬁc reasoning in young children and the fundamental irrationality of adults (Hilton,
1995; Jones & Harris, 1982; Markovits, Schleifer, & Fortier, 1989; Moshman & Franks, 1986).
Speciﬁcity and Generality of Reasoning
An important issue in the study of cognition revolves
around questions of speciﬁcity and generality. Rather
than reduce this issue to a simplistic dichotomy of domain speciﬁcity versus generality, it will be useful to consider the various ways in which reasoning could be speciﬁc or general.
One way reasoning could be speciﬁc is with respect to
domains of knowledge. Recent research with young children has suggested that they routinely construct knowledge within distinct domains such as physical causality,
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biological systems, social relations, and morality (Flavell
& Miller, Ch. 17, this Volume; R. Gelman & Williams,
Ch. 12, this Volume; S. Gelman & Wellman, Ch. 15, this
Volume; Helwig, 1995b; Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 1992; Maratsos, Ch. 9, this Volume; Spelke & Newport, Ch. 6, Volume 1). Such knowledge enables sophisticated patterns
of inference within such domains. Domain-speciﬁc inferences undoubtedly play an important role in cognition at all ages. To the extent that people reﬂect on the
epistemic properties of domain-speciﬁc inferences, they
may construct forms of reasoning speciﬁc to particular
inferential domains.
A second way reasoning could be speciﬁc is with respect to types of thinking. Problem solving, decision
making, hypothesis testing, and planning, for example, might each involve distinct forms of epistemic constraint and thus constitute or generate distinct forms of
reasoning.
A third possibility is that there are two or more distinct forms of reasoning applicable to multiple types of
thinking and multiple domains of knowledge and inference. In the next three sections of this chapter, I suggest
that three such forms of reasoning—case-based, lawbased, and dialectical—can be distinguished and that
each continues to develop long beyond childhood. Without denying the importance of domain-speciﬁc patterns
of inference and distinct types of thinking, I suggest that
each of these three forms of reasoning is applicable to
various types of thinking and multiple domains of inference. With respect to speciﬁcity and generality, there
are speciﬁc forms of reasoning, but each is general across
types of thinking and domains of inference.
Finally, there remains the possibility that we can identify still broader generalities. Individuals may, for example, achieve levels of metacognitive understanding
about the nature of inference that transcend domains of
knowledge, types of thinking, and forms of reasoning.
Research relevant to speciﬁcity and generality will be reviewed later in the chapter. First, in the next three sections, we consider three fundamental forms of reasoning.

CASE-BASED REASONING
Case-based reasoning is thinking constrained by attention to concrete manifestations (cases) that are deemed
relevant to achieving a justiﬁable cognitive outcome in
the case at hand. Two categories of case-based reasoning may be distinguished: analogical reasoning and precedent-based reasoning.
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Analogical Reasoning
In analogical inference, a situation or issue is considered on the basis of other situations or exemplars. For
example, one may approach a problem in a manner constrained by one’s perception of how a relevantly similar problem has been solved or may categorize a phenomenon on the basis of its similarities to phenomena
already categorized. Medin and Ross (1989) argue that
problem solving and categorization often rely more on
such use of concrete examples than on abstractions of
any sort. Similarly, Halford (1992) notes that transitive inferences and understanding of class inclusion relations may involve use of analogy. Given that A is longer than B and B is longer than C, for example, a child
may conclude that A is longer than C by analogy with
the spatial relations of top, middle, and bottom. There
is substantial evidence that detection, construction, and
utilization of analogical relations is routine even in preschool children (DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this Volume;
Goswami, 1991).
The fact that young children make analogical inferences, however, does not show that they intended to
make such inferences, that they have conscious control of
those inferences, or that they understand the epistemic
basis for such inferences. The emergence of analogical
thinking may be identiﬁed when a child purposely seeks
guidance from cases speciﬁcally deemed to be analogous.
Such thinking may be identiﬁed as analogical reasoning,
to the extent that the choice of analog and its application to the issue at hand are deemed justiﬁable by the
thinker. Analogical reasoning, that is, is rooted in conceptual understanding about the epistemic advantages of
using certain kinds of analogies in certain kinds of situations. Such (metacognitive) knowledge about analogy
makes it possible for relevant similarities and diﬀerences
to be deliberately assessed and coordinated.
The transition from inference to reasoning in the use
of analogy has been examined via classical analogies of
the form a is to b as c is to d. Full comprehension of such
analogies requires not only simultaneous attention to
two ﬁrst-order relations (that of a to b and that of c to d),
but explicit recognition of the asserted second-order relation of equality between the two ﬁrst-order relations
(a is to b as c is to d). Piaget’s theory postulates that the
second-order operations necessary for such comprehension do not develop until the emergence of formal operations at age 11.
Methodologically, identiﬁcation of second-order relational reasoning requires evidence that the child ex-
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plicitly compared the two ﬁrst-order relations. Given
the analogical question Hand is to ﬁnger as foot is to
what, for example, a response of toe shows analogical
reasoning only if there is evidence that the thinker explicitly considered the relation of ﬁnger to hand and
deliberately sought a response that is related to foot in
a similar way. At the very least, this requires evidence
that toe would not be a spontaneous response to foot
outside the context of the given analogy. A more stringent criterion is that the thinker can adequately justify
his or her response and explain its superiority to alternative possibilities.
Research on classical analogy problems (carefully
constructed to require systematic attention to the second-order relationship) indicates that analogical reasoning emerges long after simple analogical inferences, and
continues to develop at least through adolescence (Goldman, Pellegrino, Parseghian, & Sallis, 1982; Sternberg &
Nigro, 1980; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). Ability to explain and justify responses, moreover, is strongly correlated with the proportion of normatively correct conclusions (Goldman et al., 1982). Research and theory of the
past decade, however, have focused more on the early development (Goswami, 1991) and pervasive nature (Halford, 1992) of analogical inference (DeLoache et al., Ch.
16, this Volume). Further research on the deliberate and
reﬂective use of such inference—that is, on analogical
reasoning—would be welcome. It is here that late developmental trends are likely to be found.
This does not necessarily mean a return to classical analogy problems, however. Two key limitations of
such tasks is that they explicitly request analogical reasoning and highlight the relations to be considered. Future research might focus on how individuals (a) decide
to seek or use an analogy, (b) consciously identify potentially analogous cases, and (c) deliberately assess the
relevance of those cases via systematic consideration of
similarities and diﬀerences. These are sophisticated competencies that likely develop in adolescence and beyond,
but remain largely unexplored.
Precedent-Based Reasoning
Precedent-based reasoning resembles analogical reasoning in that analogous instances provide a basis for constraining one’s thinking. In analogical reasoning, however, the analogous instances are merely heuristic. In
precedent-based reasoning, on the other hand, application of the precedent forms a stricter constraint. Fidelity to precedent is considered mandatory; apparent de-
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viations from precedent require speciﬁc justiﬁcation.
Precedent-based reasoning is important, for example, to
certain kinds of legal thinking. In resolving a case, the
previous resolution of a relevantly similar case is not
merely an example of how the present case might be
handled, but a fundamental constraint on the legitimacy
of any solution (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992; Rissland, 1991).
Research on precedent-based reasoning is sparse. It
seems plausible, however, to posit a developmental trend
from (a) implicit analogical inference with no diﬀerentiation of precedent from analogous instance to (b) explicit recognition of precedent as a distinct type of analogous instance that is to some degree binding, and later
toward (c) increasing recognition of the role of current
choices in setting new precedents and thus constraining
future choices.
Consider, for example, a teacher’s response to student behavior that is morally dubious but does not
clearly violate any speciﬁc rule. Even a young child may
see previous responses to such behavior as relevant to
the current incident. A more advanced reasoner may
explicitly recognize the moral force of precedent: Punishment of the current behavior is more clearly unfair,
for example, if another child previously went unpunished for the same behavior. Still more advanced individuals may evaluate a teacher’s response to ambiguous
behavior with respect to the precedent that response
sets for the future.
It seems likely, then, that development of case-based
reasoning includes (a) a developmental trend from automatic analogical inference to increasingly self-conscious
analogical reasoning and (b) in domains such as law and
morality, an increasingly diﬀerentiated conception of
binding precedents as distinct from heuristic analogies.
Such developmental trends, which have received surprisingly little attention from researchers and theorists, almost surely continue into adolescence and beyond.
Legal Reasoning
Legal thinking may be deﬁned as thinking aimed at determining what the law requires or forbids. It is often argued that legal education should be aimed at teaching a
student how to “think like a lawyer,” that is, to engage in
legal reasoning. To refer to legal reasoning is to assume
the existence of a particular form of epistemic constraint
that is central and/or unique to legal thinking.
As already noted, precedent-based reasoning is important in many legal contexts. It is far from clear, how-
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ever, that precedent-based reasoning is either central or
unique to legal thinking. With respect to centrality, note
that laws typically take the form of rules and that judicial decisions often apply and/or provide general principles; thus determination of what the law requires or
forbids may involve rule-based or principled reasoning (to be discussed in the next section). With respect
to uniqueness, it has already been noted that precedentbased reasoning is important to morality as well as law.
If there is no form of reasoning central and/or unique
to the domain of law, however, it may be misleading to
speak of legal reasoning. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to focus on the application of general forms of
reasoning (such as case-based, law-based, and dialectical
reasoning) to speciﬁc domains of knowledge and action
(such as law).
This is an issue to which we will return. First, however, there are other forms of reasoning to be considered.

LAW-BASED REASONING
Law-based reasoning is thinking constrained by the deliberate application of abstract laws that are construed
by the individual as justifying his or her beliefs and/or
actions. Two general categories of laws may be distinguished: rules and principles. I begin this section by considering logical reasoning, a form of rule-based reasoning that continues to develop well beyond childhood. I
then turn to other types of rule-based reasoning. Next, I
address principled reasoning as a form of reasoning that
is law-based, but not rule-based. Finally, I raise the question of whether scientiﬁc thinking constitutes a distinct
category of law-based reasoning.
Logical Reasoning
Knowing that a hidden ball is red or blue and that it is not
red, 3-year-old Ellen concludes that the ball is blue. From
an external perspective, we may theorize that Ellen has
made an inference of the form p or q; not p; therefore q. Because the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, we may designate this a deductive inference. Even
if Ellen has indeed made this deductive inference, however, many questions remain: Did she intend to reach a
conclusion? Did she construe the relevant portion of her
knowledge as a set of premises? Does she know that she
has made an inference? Does she know that her conclusion follows necessarily from her premises? Is the inference deductive from her point of view, or only from ours?
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Children and adults routinely make inferences that
can reasonably be construed as involving the application of logical rules (Braine, 1990; Braine & O’Brien,
1991; DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this Volume; Falmagne
& Gonsalves, 1995; Hawkins, Pea, Glick, & Scribner,
1984; Lea et al., 1990; O’Brien, 1987; Rips, 1994; Scholnick, 1990; Scholnick & Wing, 1995; Smith, Langston,
.& Nisbett, 1992). Logical inference gives rise to logical thinking as children become increasingly purposeful
in the application and coordination of such rules. Logical thinking, in turn, gives rise to logical reasoning as
individuals increasingly grasp the epistemic properties
of logical rules (Keenan, Ruﬀman, & Olson, 1994). The
transition from deductive inference to deductive reasoning, for example, involves increasingly explicit understanding about the logical necessity of deductions
(Moshman, 1990).
Studies by Overton and his associates (reviewed
in Overton, 1990) suggest that the emergence of logical reasoning from logical inference is an extended process that typically continues long beyond childhood. In
one line of investigation, children and adolescents ranging from Grades 4 through 12 were presented with the
four-card selection task, a much-studied conditional reasoning problem (Overton et al., 1987; Ward & Overton,
1990). The task involves a proposition of the form if p
then q and four potential sources of information about
the truth or falsity of that proposition. Speciﬁcally, the
thinker may choose to investigate (a) whether a given p
is associated with q or with not-q; (b) whether a given
not-p is associated with q or with not-q; (c) whether a
given q is associated with p or with not-p; and/or (d)
whether a given not-q is associated with p or with notp. Solution of the task requires the insight that only the
combination p and not-q falsiﬁes a proposition of the
form if p then q. Thus investigations a and d are relevant
to the truth of the conditional proposition because they
could falsify it, whereas investigations b and c are unnecessary because no possible result of these investigations
would disconﬁrm the conditional proposition. Although
young children routinely make simple conditional inferences (Scholnick, 1990; Scholnick & Wing, 1995), the
selection task is notoriously diﬃcult even for college students (Evans, 1989; Newstead & Evans, 1995).
Part of the diﬃculty of the selection task is that the
thinker must do more than simply generate a conclusion
from premises using a conditional inference rule. Rather,
the thinker must coordinate a variety of hypothetical conditional relations, including (a) the given conditional proposition, which the thinker knows may be true

Chapter : Cognitive Development beyond Childhood

or false, and (b) the implications of each of the two possible results for each of the four potential investigations.
Although some versions of the selection task are rarely
solved by individuals of any age, Overton and his associates showed dramatic increases over the course of adolescence in the ability to solve meaningful variations of
the task. The eﬀects of content raise issues of generality
that will be addressed later. The developmental trends,
however, are consistent with a conception of conditional
reasoning as a late-developing form of thinking involving deliberate coordination of conditional inferences on
the basis of explicit understanding about the nature and
justiﬁability of conditional inference rules.
In a more direct approach to assessing the development of understanding about the nature of logic, Moshman and Franks (1986) presented 197 individuals
in Grades 4 (ages 9 to 10), 7 (ages 12 to 13), and college (ages 18 to 43) with a variety of logic-related tasks.
Some of these simply required participants to make a
correct inference from a set of premises. Performance on
the simple inference tasks was nearly perfect at all ages
across a variety of logical forms.
Other tasks involved the same logical forms, but required
metalogical judgments about entire arguments. In a variety of conditions across three studies, participants were
asked to sort, rank, and evaluate arguments varying with
respect to: (a) form; (b) content; (c) empirical truth of
the premises; (d) empirical truth of the conclusion; and
(e) validity (i.e., whether the conclusion followed from
the premises). Of central concern was whether participants would distinguish validity from truth, recognizing that (a) an argument in which the conclusion follows
logically from the premises is valid even if the premises and/or conclusion are false, and (b) an argument in
which the conclusion does not follow logically from the
premises is not valid, even if the premises and/or conclusion are true.
As expected, truth was a salient consideration at all
ages. In cases where truth status and validity were in
conﬂict, even college students often had diﬃculty focusing on the latter. There were substantial age diﬀerences,
however. Most college students clearly understood the
metalogical distinction between valid and invalid arguments and applied this distinction spontaneously, albeit
inconsistently. Seventh graders were usually less spontaneous in their application of the concept of validity but nevertheless, in supportive circumstances, most
showed genuine understanding. Fourth graders, by contrast, generally failed to distinguish validity from truth,
even in conditions where they were provided with def-
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initions, examples, and/or feedback concerning the nature of validity.
Related research by Markovits and his associates
(Markovits & Bouﬀard-Bouchard, 1992; Markovits
& Nantel, 1989; Markovits & Vachon, 1989; see also
Efklides, Demetriou, & Metallidou, 1994) has shown
that the ability to deduce conclusions from premises explicitly known to be hypothetical or false shows substantial development over the course of adolescence. Markovits and Bouﬀard-Bouchard (1992), moreover, found
a positive relationship between (a) explicit knowledge
about the distinction between inferential validity and
empirical truth and (b) reasoning in accord with logical
norms. Metalogical insight does not guarantee perfect
reasoning, but may facilitate the application of logical
rules to abstract content and the successful coordination
of inferences on complex logical tasks.
Such ﬁndings are consistent with the core Piagetian claim that formal or hypothetico-deductive reasoning develops much later than competence in elementary
logical inference. Without indicating a sudden transition at any particular age, developmental research on
logical reasoning suggests that formal reasoning is common (albeit inconsistent) in adolescents and adults, but
rarely seen much before the age of 11. This is not to
say, however, that formal reasoning rests on formal operations. The transition from logical inference to logical reasoning may have less to do with logical structure
than with the thinker’s metacognitive attitude toward
the propositions under consideration (Campbell &
Bickhard, 1986).
Logical reasoning, then, seems to emerge long after logical inference. Although young children routinely
make inferences in accord with rules of logic, only later
in development do individuals increasingly think about
such rules and understand their epistemic role in justifying connections among propositions. The construction of
such metacognitive knowledge about logic may account
for late developmental trends in the deliberate application and coordination of logical rules.
Rule-Based Reasoning
Although logical reasoning is the most researched form
of rule-based reasoning, similar trends from rule-based
inference to rule-based reasoning can be identiﬁed with
respect to other systems of rules. In a classic investigation of the development of probabilistic concepts, Piaget
and Inhelder (1951/1975) interviewed children and adolescents of ages 3 through 15 about chance phenom-
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ena involving balls, coins, cards, marbles, counters, toy
men, and a spinner rigged with hidden magnets. Results
showed developmental changes extending through early
adolescence in conceptual knowledge about randomness,
proportionality, normal distribution, the law of large
numbers, and combinatorial possibilities. Unlike children
under age 11, adolescents were frequently able to devise
systems for generating all possible permutations, combinations, or other arrangements of a set of elements. Explicit knowledge of combinatorial possibilities, argued
Piaget and Inhelder, provides the basis for insight into
statistical regularities and thus for rule-based reasoning
about patterns and distributions of chance events.
Research over the past several decades has shown that
elementary laws of probability are implicit in the probabilistic inferences of children as young as age 4 (Huber
& Huber, 1987). Consistent with Piaget and Inhelder’s
ﬁndings, however, it appears that probabilistic and proportional reasoning develop over a period extending well
into adolescence (Ahl, Moore, & Dixon, 1992; Dixon &
Moore, 1996; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1986; Moore, Dixon,
& Haines, 1991). Sophisticated probabilistic concepts
and associated forms of reasoning, in fact, remain elusive even in adults ( Jones & Harris, 1982; Kosonen &
Winne, 1995).
One area of probabilistic reasoning in which late developmental trends have received substantial attention
is correlational reasoning. The standard methodological
paradigm, devised by Inhelder and Piaget (1958), is to
present children and/or adults with frequency data allowing judgments about the covariation of two dichotomous variables. For example, given information about
the frequency of each of four potential combinations of
hair color and eye color—dark hair/dark eyes; dark hair/
light eyes; light hair/dark eyes; light hair/light eyes—it
is possible to determine the direction and magnitude of
the correlation, if any, between hair color and eye color.
Although correlational inferences can be made from isolated bits of data, defensible conclusions about the existence and direction of a correlation require appropriate coordination of frequencies with respect to each of
the four possible combinations. Research indicates that
systematic application of sophisticated rules for assessing covariation in such data continues to develop at least
through adolescence (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), with
substantial variation in adult performance (Shaklee,
Holt, Elek, & Hall, 1988).
In many studies of logical and mathematical cognition, response patterns across carefully designed variations of standard tasks suggest the rule-based nature of
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subjects’ inferences and judgments. Through systematic
application of this rule-assessment methodology, Siegler
(1981) has demonstrated that even young children use
rules in responding to a variety of tasks. His research has
indicated developmental trends in multiple domains toward increasingly systematic coordination of such rules.
In addition to logical and mathematical rules, individuals may also apply a variety of social and moral rules.
Although such rules may be identiﬁed in the ongoing
social and moral inferences of young children, increasingly sophisticated conceptual knowledge regarding the
nature and justiﬁcation of such rules may underlie the
long-term construction of social and moral reasoning
through adolescence and, for many, well into adulthood
(Moshman, 1995b).
Holyoak and Cheng (1995a, 1995b) have proposed
that people often solve logical reasoning tasks by assimilating them to their knowledge of certain kinds of social, moral, and legal rules. Depending on content and
context, for example, a conditional of the form if p then
q might be construed as a deontic statement of permission or obligation (e.g., if you are at least 21 years old,
then you may drink beer). This may activate a pragmatic
reasoning schema that might suﬃce to solve the task in
question. Research with variations of the selection task
has indicated that pragmatic reasoning schemas may enable appropriate selections by adults (Holyoak & Cheng,
1995a, 1995b; Manktelow & Over, 1995) and by children as young as age 7 (Girotto, Blaye, & Farioli, 1989;
Girotto, Gilly, Blaye, & Light, 1989; Light, Blaye, Gilly,
& Girotto, 1989).
The work on pragmatic reasoning schemas suggests
that rule-based inference and reasoning often rely on
content-speciﬁc social and moral rules, rather than on
more abstract logical rules. A more radical approach entirely rejects the assumption that people engage in rulebased inference or reasoning. Johnson-Laird and Byrne
(1991; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992) have
argued that reasoning involves the construction and manipulation of concrete mental models of potential states
of aﬀairs and is thus a semantic, rather than a formal or
syntactic, process. Reasoning does not require the application of rules, at least none that can be designated
as logical. Developmental changes in reasoning, in this
view, reﬂect (a) emergence of the linguistic ability to
comprehend logical terms in the premises (e.g., all, some,
none, if, and, or, and not), and thus construct appropriate models of the premises, and (b) improvements in the
manipulation of these models due to the growth of processing capacity ( Johnson-Laird, 1990).
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Although theorists generally agree that children
and adults can and do use pragmatic reasoning schemas and mental models for a variety of cognitive purposes, including solving many kinds of logical problems,
most argue that people also apply logical and other rules
(Braine, 1990; Braine & O’Brien, 1991; DeLoache et al.,
Ch. 16, this Volume; Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, & Cheng,
1987; O’Brien, Braine, & Yang, 1994; Scholnick, 1990;
Sloman, 1996; E. E. Smith et al., 1992; L. Smith, 1993).
Consistent with the view that people use both rules and
models, Markovits (1993; Markovits & Vachon, 1990)
has proposed a theoretical integration of Piagetian and
information-processing approaches to conditional reasoning in which developing conceptions of necessity and
possibility (Piaget, 1987) are associated with qualitative
transitions to increasingly abstract uses of mental models over the course of childhood and adolescence.
We may thus posit a category of rule-based reasoning
including, but not limited to, logical and mathematical
reasoning. Regardless of the speciﬁc rules involved, rulebased inference gives rise to rule-based thinking as children become increasingly purposeful in the application
and coordination of rules (Zelazo, Reznick, & Piñon,
1995). Rule-based thinking, in turn, gives rise to rulebased reasoning as individuals increasingly grasp the
epistemic properties of their rules (Keenan et al., 1994;
Moshman, 1995a, 1995b).
Methodologically, then, a key criterion for demonstrating that an individual has engaged in rule-based
reasoning is evidence that the individual is purposely applying what she or he deems to be epistemologically justiﬁable rules. Strict application of this criterion may be
useful in resolving the apparent paradox that young children routinely make inferences in accord with logical,
mathematical, and other norms (Braine, 1990; Hawkins
et al., 1984; Huber & Huber, 1987; Scholnick, 1990;
Scholnick & Wing, 1995), whereas adults routinely
make inferences that deviate systematically from such
norms (Evans, 1989; Newstead & Evans, 1995).
With respect to young children, task demands are often such that genuine reasoning is unnecessary. Hawkins
et al. (1984), for example, showed that young children
can reach correct conclusions from various sets of premises. Markovits et al. (1989) replicated these ﬁndings,
but showed that removing the logical connections across
premises made little diﬀerence in young children’s responses, with increasing attention to logical form over
the course of later childhood.
Tasks designed for adults, on the other hand, are often suﬃciently complex that, depending on how a par-
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ticipant interprets the social context and task instructions, she or he may engage in sophisticated reasoning
without reaching the conclusion indicated by the normative rules that the researcher intended to assess. Hilton (1995), for example, shows how conversational assumptions and attributions may account for reasonable
but incorrect responses to a variety of reasoning tasks.
Thus, early success on some logical tasks and adult failure on others may mask an underlying developmental
transition from automatic rule-based inferences to selfconsciously rule-based reasoning.
Principled Reasoning
Reﬂection on laws may generate a distinction between
rules and principles. Rules are algorithms that yield a
determinate answer—for example, laws of deduction,
arithmetic, or probability. If two individuals are applying
the same rule in the same circumstance, they must reach
the same conclusion unless one of them makes a mistake. Principles, in contrast, are general guidelines whose
application involves heuristic judgments. Reasonable
people may diﬀer about such judgments. Principled reasoning derives from commitment to some set of principles on the basis of a general metacognitive understanding about the nature and use of principles.
A variety of theorists have proposed principles implicit
in everyday inference. Hilton (1995) and Politzer (1986),
for example, discussed conversational principles that guide
social interaction. Walton (1996) proposed a set of argumentation schemes that provide heuristic guidance in
contexts where formal rules of logic are inadequate. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identiﬁed several judgment
heuristics routinely applied to probabilistic situations by
children ( Jacobs & Potenza, 1991) as well as adults.
In a study of mathematical reasoning, Dixon and
Moore (1996) presented 116 students in Grades 2, 5,
8, 11, and college with tasks requiring them to predict
the temperature that would result from adding one container of water to another. Patterns of judgment across
tasks and verbal protocols were used to identify (a) intuitive principles concerning the eﬀects of relative temperature and quantity on the direction and relative magnitude of temperature change and (b) mathematical
strategies for calculating ﬁnal temperature. Application
of appropriate principles increased with age through adolescence and was a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for use of appropriate mathematical strategies.
Kohlberg (1984) suggested that principled reasoning is central to higher levels of moral development. The
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advanced moral reasoner construes morality as a matter of acting in accord with justiﬁable principles. Unlike
moral rules, such principles do not dictate the one right
solution to a moral dilemma. Rather, they constrain the
range of acceptable solutions. Kohlberg’s theory, especially in its later versions, sets stringent structural criteria for principled moral reasoning, with the result that
such reasoning apparently fails to develop in most people and is rarely seen prior to late adolescence. Moshman
(1995b) proposed a less stringent conception of moral
principles in the form of metalaws justifying a variety of
moral rules. Such principles, he suggested, are implicit in
the understanding and use of moral rules by young children and increasingly become explicit objects of reﬂection over a period extending through adolescence.
Helwig (1995a, in press) and Dunkle (1993) speciﬁcally
studied the development of principles related to freedoms
of expression and religion. They found substantial improvement over the course of childhood and adolescence
in the comprehension, application, justiﬁcation, and coordination of such principles. Evidence for both early competence and late developmental change notwithstanding,
it appears that adolescents and adults show forms of principled reasoning that are qualitatively superior to the rulebased inferences of young children (Moshman, 1993).
Available evidence is thus consistent with a general
trend from the use of implicit principles to the deliberate application of explicit principles (Moshman, 1995b).
One may thus posit a developmental trend from (a) undiﬀerentiated law-based inferences toward (b) rule-based
and principled reasoning.
Scientiﬁc Reasoning
Many theorists and researchers have been particularly
interested in empirical inference, in which the thinker
generalizes from what is construed as information about
some aspect of reality. At a primitive level, an individual
might simply make inductive inferences from available
data without any intention to generate knowledge. At a
more advanced level, the individual may intend to make
inferences in such a way as to yield correct generalizations about speciﬁc empirical phenomena and may deliberately seek new evidence with this in mind. We may
call this scientiﬁc thinking.
In attempting to reach the best generalizations, thinkers may constrain their inferences in accord with what
they take to be appropriate norms. A major line of research initiated by Inhelder and Piaget (1958) has assumed that the isolation of variables and corresponding rules of inference are fundamental norms of science.
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Such research indicates developmental trends extending into adolescence in the successful use of such rules
(Kuhn & Brannock, 1977).
Others, however, have argued that scientiﬁc thinking
cannot be reduced to some set of rules; rather, it relies
heavily on heuristic principles. Principled scientiﬁc reasoning might, for example, involve general preferences
for theories superior in parsimony, explanatory range,
empirical adequacy, and internal consistency. Samarapungavan (1992) found that conformity to some such
principles can be detected in the scientiﬁc thinking of
children as young as age 7, but that there is improvement well beyond that age in the ability to provide explicit justiﬁcations based on principles of theory selection and in the application of such principles to theories
inconsistent with one’s own beliefs.
Theorists have also questioned the common assumption that scientiﬁc reasoning, at its core, involves seeking
data that would disconﬁrm one’s hypothesis. A number
of theorists have proposed that conﬁrmation bias—an
allegedly irrational tendency to accumulate supportive
evidence, rather than genuinely testing a hypothesis—
may be better construed as a conﬁrmation heuristic that
serves a useful purpose in early phases of scientiﬁc inquiry (Tweney & Chitwood, 1995). Similarly, Koslowski
and Maqueda (1993) argue that conﬁrmation and disconﬁrmation are interrelated aspects of a defensible heuristic approach to testing and revising theories.
These considerations suggest that scientiﬁc thinking
may improve with the development of rule-based and
principled reasoning and raise the possibility that some
sorts of law-based reasoning may be suﬃciently central
and unique to science as to be designated scientiﬁc reasoning. As we will see, however, questions about the existence and nature of scientiﬁc reasoning are complicated
by indications that scientiﬁc thinking involves a complex
dialectical coordination of theories, evidence, and methodologies (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; DeLoache et al., Ch.
16, this Volume; Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al.,
1993; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1995; Kuhn, Schauble, & Garcia-Mila, 1992; Schauble, 1990, 1996). The present discussion of methodological rules and heuristics only begins our consideration of scientiﬁc reasoning. We will
return to the topic shortly.

DIALECTICAL REASONING
Although the term dialectic is notably protean in its
meanings, it generally refers to a developmental transfor-
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mation. Cognitive development is construed by many theorists as an intrinsically dialectical process. We may deﬁne dialectical thinking as the deliberate coordination of
inferences for the purpose of making cognitive progress.
Such thinking may be designated as dialectical reasoning
to the extent that it rests on explicit knowledge about criteria for assessing such progress. Thus, the development of
dialectical reasoning involves increasingly explicit knowledge about the nature of cognitive development and increasingly deliberate eﬀorts to further that process.
Dialectical Reﬂection
In some cases, a thinker believes that a previous concrete
case provides an appropriate constraint for resolving a
current issue. I have deﬁned the eﬀort to apply a previous case to a current one as case-based reasoning. In
other cases, a thinker believes that an abstract law provides the appropriate constraint. I have deﬁned the application of such a law as law-based reasoning.
However, there are often a variety of potentially applicable cases and laws. It is not unusual, moreover, for
these to point in diﬀerent directions. With respect to a
particular moral dilemma, for example, the thinker may
perceive conﬂicts among applicable rules, principles,
and precedents. Moreover, the moral obligations indicated by applicable rules, principles, and precedents may
be construed as inconsistent with moral intuitions based
on one’s experience with analogous situations. Deliberate eﬀorts to achieve coherence by reconstructing one’s
rules, principles, intuitions, and/or conceptions of precedent may be designated as dialectical reﬂection. More
generally, dialectical reﬂection may be deﬁned as a deliberate eﬀort to make conceptual progress through active metacognition.
Basseches (1980, 1984), expanding on the work of
Riegel (1973), formulated a set of 24 dialectical schemata—forms of thinking that apply sophisticated
knowledge about structure, relations, context, perspective,
contradiction, activity, change, and progress. He then interviewed nine ﬁrst-year college students, nine seniors,
and nine faculty members about the nature of education
in order to get samples of reasoning about a complex issue. The dialectical schemata turned out to be well represented in the thinking of these research participants,
and use of the schemata was positively correlated with
educational level, consistent with the view that, at least
among well-educated individuals, dialectical reﬂection
continues to develop through late adolescence and early
adulthood. Research by Chandler and Boutilier (1992)
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suggests that dialectical reasoning may be critical for understanding living, social, and other dynamic systems.
For reﬂection to be designated as dialectical reasoning, it must involve a deliberate eﬀort to apply some criterion of progress. As already suggested, a common and
important such criterion is increasing coherence. Thus, dialectical reﬂection may be construed broadly as encompassing what Moshman (1995a) called coherence-based
reasoning. This would include both (a) reasoning aimed at
achieving the temporal coherence of a narrative that unfolds across time (Feldman, Bruner, Kalmar, & Renderer,
1993), and (b) reasoning aimed at achieving more abstract
forms of structural coherence (Fallon, 1987). Although an
implicit preference for narrative or structural coherence
may be characteristic even of young children’s cognition
(Piaget, 1985), the deliberate quest for coherence is usefully construed as a form of dialectical reasoning.
Argumentation
In many cases, dialectical reasoning is a profoundly social process. Kuhn (1991) investigated how adolescents
and adults justify and defend their ideas in the face of alternative interpretations and viewpoints. Although participants were interviewed individually, they were challenged to provide arguments adequate to convince others
and to respond to potential others who might hold different ideas.
The data showed argumentation skills to be far from
perfect. People frequently failed to justify their own
ideas and to evaluate alternatives on the basis of relevant
considerations. Nevertheless, Kuhn provides a picture of
reasoning as a collaborative process in which people formulate, communicate, criticize, justify, and revise their
various ideas. Argumentation is usefully construed as a
process of dialectical reasoning in which two or more individuals coordinate multiple cases and laws in a shared
eﬀort to make conceptual progress. That is, although arguments may be formulated and evaluated by individuals, argumentation is a fundamentally social process
of collaborative reasoning. A number of studies suggest
that, in some circumstances, reciprocal argumentation
among two or more individuals may yield better results
than individual reasoning (Dimant & Bearison, 1991).
Moshman and Geil (in press), for example, showed
qualitatively superior performance in groups of college
students reasoning about the original and most diﬃcult
version of the selection task (see earlier discussion under Logical Reasoning) than in individuals faced with the
same task. Students solved the task either individually or
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in groups of 5 or 6. The groups were instructed to discuss the task with each other until reaching a consensus. Thus, in addition to the logical reasoning required
in both conditions, the group condition involved a sustained process of argumentation. That is, group members
engaged in a process of collaborative reasoning in which
they proposed, justiﬁed, criticized, and defended a variety of potential solutions.
The diﬀerence between individual and group conditions was stark. Consistent with earlier research using
this version of the task (Evans, 1989; Newstead & Evans, 1995), only 9% of students in the individual condition success-fully tested the hypothesized conditional
relation by systematically seeking evidence that could
falsify it. In contrast, the correct falsiﬁcation pattern was
the consensus response for 75% of the 20 groups.
In half of the groups, individuals were asked to propose their own solutions prior to group discussion, thus
enabling comparison of individual and group solutions.
Of the 57 students in these 10 groups, 35 switched from
incorrect to correct response patterns in the course of
discussion, while only two showed the reverse transition. Moreover, these changes were not simply a matter of succumbing to peer pressure. The falsiﬁcation response pattern was not initially the most common view
in any group. Nevertheless, it was the pattern chosen by
eight of these 10 groups. There were three groups, in fact,
where not a single individual had initially selected the
falsiﬁcation pattern; all three of these groups, however,
were among those that ultimately selected this pattern as
the consensus solution.
These results support a conception of argumentation
as a rational group process that may, in some circumstances, be superior to individual reasoning (Kobayashi,
1994). Such a conception, in turn, has important implications for our conception of reasoning. Reasoning is
traditionally viewed as taking place within an individual.
An alternative is to view reasoning as a fundamentally
social process of group interchange, with individual reasoning a derivative phenomenon involving internalized
aspects of the group process (Salmon & Zeitz, 1995). A
middle-ground possibility is that individual and collaborative reasoning are partially distinct and equally fundamental, developing via a complex process of reciprocal inﬂuence.
Legal and Scientiﬁc Reasoning Revisited
As noted earlier, precedent often plays a central role
in legal thinking. It would be too simple, however, to
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identify legal reasoning as a version of precedent-based
reasoning. Fallon (1987), for example, proposes that
constitutional interpretation not only involves consideration of (a) precedent, but also of (b) the literal
meaning of speciﬁcally relevant provisions of the constitutional text; (c) historical considerations regarding
the intended meaning of that text; (d) general considerations of constitutional theory; and (e) general ethical principles. Constitutional reasoning, in his view,
properly involves a process of dialectical reﬂection that
attempts to bring these ﬁve considerations into equilibrium. More generally, it appears that legal thinking
involves a variety of forms of case-based, law-based,
and dialectical reasoning.
Scientiﬁc thinking, it appears, is no less complex.
Kuhn and her associates (1989; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1992,
1995; Schauble, 1990, 1996) have investigated scientiﬁc thinking as a dialectical process involving the coordination of theories and data. As noted earlier, scientiﬁc thinking can be construed more simply as a matter
of following methodological rules, such as holding all
variables but one constant or seeking data that would
falsify one’s hypothesis. Philosophers of science generally agree, however, that no set of methodological rules
provides a direct path to scientiﬁc truth (R. Kitchener,
1986). Although acknowledging the role of methodological rules, Kuhn and her associates have found that
(a) people’s theories aﬀect the collection and interpretation of data; (b) nevertheless, the resulting evidence
sometimes leads to appropriate changes in those theories; and (c) the eﬀort to coordinate theories and data
sometimes leads to reﬂection on and reconstruction of
strategies for knowledge acquisition. Research by Dunbar and Klahr (1989; Klahr et al., 1993) has yielded
similar results (see also DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this
Volume).
In a broad-ranging review of the philosophical and
psychological literatures on reﬂective theory change,
Chinn and Brewer (1993) noted seven ways that individuals may respond to anomalous data.
1. The data may simply be ignored;
2. The data may be rejected as resulting from methodological error, random processes, or fraud;
3. The data may be excluded as outside the domain of
the theory in question;
4. The data may be held in abeyance pending further
articulation and development of the theory;
5. The data may be reinterpreted so as to render them
consistent with the theory;
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6. Peripheral aspects of the theory may be modiﬁed
to accommodate the data; and,
7. There may be a change in core theoretical
commitments.
What happens when one confronts anomalous data
is a function of many factors, including (a) entrenchment of the relevant theory; (b) metatheoretical beliefs
about theories and theory change; (c) other background
knowledge; (d) availability of a plausible alternative theory; (e) quality of the alternative theory with respect to
metatheoretical criteria such as scope, parsimony, empirical support, internal consistency, consistency with other
theories, and fruitfulness in generating new research; (f )
credibility, clarity, and scope of the anomalous data; and
(g) the extent to which the individual reﬂects on the relevant theories and data.
Developmentally, the ability to distinguish generalizations from data and apply logical rules concerning the
relation between these is typically present by age 6 (Ruﬀman, Perner, Olson, & Doherty, 1993; Sodian, Zaitchik,
& Carey, 1991). The ability to construe such generalizations as hypotheses and evaluate potential sources of
data, however, continues to develop at least through adolescence (Overton, 1990; Overton et al., 1987; Ward &
Overton, 1990). The ongoing coordination of theories,
data, and methodologies over a series of investigations,
moreover, may require processes of dialectical reﬂection
that continue to develop, for some, long beyond childhood (Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al., 1993; Kuhn,
1989; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1992, 1995; Schauble, 1990,
1996). Although demonstrably inadequate strategies
and interpretations are common at all ages, these studies have shown developmental progress beyond childhood in the ability to deliberately coordinate theories,
data, and methodologies so as to improve one’s understanding. Scientiﬁc thinking, in other words, appears to
become increasingly dialectical.
With these considerations in mind, we may return to
the earlier questions about legal and scientiﬁc reasoning.
Given that there does not appear to be any form of reasoning central and unique to thinking about law, it is not
clear what it means to speak of legal reasoning. Similarly,
given the lack of evidence for a particular form of reasoning central and unique to empirical investigation, it
may be misleading to speak of scientiﬁc reasoning.
A direct comparison of legal and scientiﬁc thinking, however, suggests that they may indeed rest on distinguishable forms of rationality. Precedent often plays
a key role in the justiﬁcation of a legal claim, whereas
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in the scientiﬁc context, a comparable appeal to history
or authority would likely be seen as fundamentally illegitimate. Correspondingly, scientiﬁc respect for empirical data arguably deﬁnes a form of rationality distinct
from the precedent-based rationality of law. Such considerations suggest the possibility that various forms of
case-based, law-based, and dialectical reasoning can be
coordinated so as to produce new forms of reasoning
unique to particular domains of knowledge (such as law)
or types of thinking (such as hypothesis testing). Empirically and conceptually, however, we are a long way from
knowing what those forms of reasoning might be.

THE RATIONAL BASIS OF REASONING
Reasoning, as deﬁned earlier, involves constraining one’s
thinking on the basis of explicit knowledge about various mental actions and the justiﬁability of their results.
By deﬁnition, reasoning is done by a rational agent, one
who has reasons for his or her beliefs and behavior. In
this section, I elaborate on the nature and development
of rationality.
Metacognitive Understanding
Research already reviewed suggests that conceptual
knowledge about cognition begins to emerge during
childhood but, for most individuals, continues to develop
at least into adolescence. A strong case can be made that
the emergence of increasingly sophisticated metacognitive understanding is a central aspect of advanced cognitive development.
With respect to logical reasoning, for example, we
have seen that even young children routinely make a variety of correct inferences (Braine, 1990; Hawkins et al.,
1984; Scholnick, 1990; Scholnick & Wing, 1995). Metalogical understanding, however—conceptual knowledge about the nature of logic—is a later development.
Although young children have intuitions of possibility, impossibility, necessity, and contingency, reﬂection
on the logic of such intuitions generates higher levels
of understanding about their signiﬁcance and interrelations (Piaget, 1987; Piaget & Voyat, 1979; Pieraut-Le
Bonniec, 1980). Recognizing logically necessary relations of hypothetical possibilities, for example, most adolescents and adults show an appreciation of inferential validity rarely seen in children much before age 11
(Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Moshman, 1990; Moshman & Franks, 1986).
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Similarly, even young children are able to reach a conclusion about a hypothesis on the basis of evidence. Research suggests that children begin distinguishing generalizations from data as early as age 6 (Ruﬀman, et al.,
1993; Sodian et al., 1991). The construction of metatheoretical understanding, however, appears to continue at
least through adolescence. Developing individuals show
increasing ability to construe generalizations as hypotheses, and to construe data as evidence bearing on those
hypotheses. This may account for the long-term development of a deliberate orientation toward isolating variables, seeking falsifying evidence, and coordinating theories with evidence in ongoing investigations (Kuhn,
1989, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1988, 1995; Overton, 1990;
Schauble, 1990, 1996). Thus, with development, the use
of theories may become increasingly sophisticated because of the increasing ability to think about theories
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).
These ﬁndings have important implications for our
conception of the development of rationality. If we deﬁne rationality as correct inference, even young children
are substantially rational and developmental trends in rationality are far from robust. If, on the other hand, we deﬁne rationality as involving some degree of metacognitive
understanding about knowledge and thinking, a stronger
case can be made that rationality develops over a period
of time that, for many people, extends long beyond childhood (Moshman, 1994). Theoretical conceptions of cognitive development increasingly stress emergence of metacognitive understanding. Campbell and Bickhard (1986),
for example, deﬁne higher stages as higher levels of reﬂection. Taking a somewhat diﬀerent approach, Demetriou,
Efklides, and Platsidou (1993) posit a “hypercognitive
system,” a developing “supersystem” that understands, organizes, and inﬂuences other aspects of cognition.
There remains the question of the relation of metacognitive understanding to reasoning. If metacognitive understanding were completely unrelated to normatively
correct reasoning, one might wonder why it develops.
Moshman (1994) suggests a conception of rationality as
“metasubjective objectivity,” involving defensible forms
of reasoning that emerge via reﬂection on one’s subjectivity. Correlational evidence indicates positive relationships between metacognitive understanding and normatively appropriate reasoning (Goldman et al., 1982; Kuhn,
1991; Markovits & Bouﬀard-Bouchard, 1992). Microgenetic research suggests that long-term reﬂection on reasoning leads not only to knowledge about reasoning, but
to corresponding improvements in the quality of reasoning (Kuhn et al., 1992, 1995; Schauble, 1990, 1996).
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Epistemic Cognition
Epistemic cognition is an aspect of metacognitive understanding involving knowledge about the nature and
limits of knowledge, including knowledge about the justiﬁability of various cognitive processes and actions. A
variety of theories and research programs have addressed
the development of epistemic cognition (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule,
1986; Broughton, 1978; Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990;
King & Kitchener, 1994; K. Kitchener, 1983; Kuhn,
1991; Orr & Luszcz, 1994; Perry, 1970; Reich, Oser, &
Valentin, 1994; Schommer, 1994; Schommer & Walker,
1995; Schraw & Moshman, 1995).
Research into epistemic cognition typically involves interviewing children, adolescents, and/or adults about the
justiﬁcation of knowledge in general and/or about the
epistemic properties of their own theories and reasoning.
The most systematic approach to the assessment of epistemic cognition is the Reﬂective Judgment Interview (RJI)
developed by King and Kitchener (1994). The RJI uses a
semistructured format in which the interviewer presents
a series of epistemic dilemmas. One such dilemma, for
example, involves contradictory evidence regarding the
safety of chemical additives in food. For each dilemma,
the interviewee is asked about the origin and justiﬁcation
of his or her own viewpoint; whether this viewpoint could
ever be proven correct; why people, including experts, disagree; and how such disagreements should be interpreted
or resolved. Research with the RJI has provided substantial support for King and Kitchener’s seven-stage model
of the development of reﬂective judgment.
Although diﬀering as to speciﬁcs and terminology,
most theorists of epistemic cognition have postulated a
developmental sequence from objectivist to subjectivist
to rationalist conceptions of cognition over the course of
adolescence and early adulthood, with substantial individual diﬀerences in the extent of progress through these
levels. The objectivist construes knowledge as absolute
and unproblematic. Justiﬁcation, if considered at all, is
simply a matter of appealing to direct observation or
to the pronouncements of an authority. Such epistemic
conceptions are typical of children and commonly seen
in adolescents and adults as well.
Subjectivist conceptions of cognition involve relativist
epistemologies. Knowledge is deemed to be uncertain,
ambiguous, idiosyncratic, contextual, and/or subjective;
justiﬁcation in any strong or general sense is considered
impossible. As one subject put it, “I wouldn’t say that
one person is wrong and another person is right. Each
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person, I think, has their own truth” (King & Kitchener,
1994, p. 64). Although some researchers have concluded
that systematic subjectivism is rarely predominant before
the college years (King & Kitchener, 1994), there is evidence that relativist conceptions of knowledge are common among adolescents (Chandler et al., 1990).
Finally, some individuals appear to make progress
in late adolescence or beyond toward a more rationalist epistemology. Without returning to earlier notions of
absolute and ﬁnal truth or abandoning insights regarding context and subjectivity, the rationalist believes there
are justiﬁable norms of inquiry such that, in some cases,
some beliefs reasonably may be deemed to be better justiﬁed than others. Theory and research on epistemic cognition, then, are consistent with a view of rationality as
metacognitive in nature and developing, at least in some
cases, well into adulthood.
There is also evidence linking epistemic cognition to
other aspects of cognition. Schommer (1994; Schommer & Walker, 1995) has identiﬁed epistemic beliefs
that predict better comprehension and academic performance. Kuhn (1991) has shown a positive relationship
between holding a rationalist epistemology and skill in
argumentation. Chandler et al. (1990) provided evidence
that advanced forms of epistemic cognition are positively associated with identity formation and negatively
associated with psychopathology. Thus, epistemic cognition appears to be interconnected with learning, thinking, reasoning, and development.
Rational Identity
Although rationality is in part a cognitive phenomenon, the development of rationality should not be narrowly construed as the development of purely cognitive competencies. The ideally rational individual is one
who spontaneously seeks relevant evidence and alternative views with the intent of altering his or her beliefs as
appropriate. Such a person may be conceived as having a
“critical spirit” (Siegel, 1988).
Critical spirit is more a matter of disposition than of
ability. Perkins, Jay, and Tishman (1993) propose that
good thinking includes dispositions to (a) be openminded, ﬂexible, and adventurous; (b) sustain intellectual
curiosity; (c) clarify and seek understanding; (d) be planful and strategic; (e) be intellectually careful; (f ) seek and
evaluate reasons; and (g) be metacognitive. Although
such dispositions would be of little use without associated cognitive abilities, those abilities may remain inert
without the associated dispositions.
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At a more global level, Cederblom (1989) suggests a
developmental trend from (a) identifying oneself with
one’s beliefs toward (b) identifying oneself as a beliefforming process. To the extent that one identiﬁes oneself with one’s beliefs, any threat to those beliefs is likely
to be seen as a threat to the self. Thus, even if one has the
cognitive competence to change those beliefs appropriately, one is likely to resist evidence or arguments that
suggest such change is necessary. To the extent that one
identiﬁes oneself as a belief-forming process, however,
one is more likely to apply one’s rational competencies.
In this latter case, one construes the process of appropriately changing one’s beliefs as conﬁrming one’s identity
as a rational agent.
Rationality, then, transcends cognition to include motivational and dispositional considerations. The development of rationality is best construed as including the formation of a variety of intellectual dispositions and, more
broadly, a critical spirit and a rational identity.

THE REFLECTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF
RATIONALITY
I have proposed that advanced cognitive development
is in large part the development of reasoning—that is,
epistemologically self-constrained thinking. Reasoning,
thus deﬁned, is done by a rational agent—that is, an individual whose thinking is rooted in epistemic forms of
metacognitive understanding. It follows that cognitive
development beyond childhood consists largely of the
development of rationality.
Now turn to questions of developmental process. In
the present section, I present two approaches to accounting for the development of rationality—causal determinism and rational constructivism. Highlighting the latter,
I conclude that rationality is best construed as a metacognitive phenomenon constructed through active processes of reﬂection.
Causal Determinism
A standard form of scientiﬁc explanation is to suggest that some event or process is caused by some other
event or process. For example, if object A collides with
stationary object B and the latter immediately begins to
move, we are likely to explain the motion of B as caused
by the impact of A. Causal explanations raise a variety of
philosophical questions and become increasingly problematic as one moves from (a) physical interactions of
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macroscopic objects to (b) biological processes of anatomic and physiological development, then to (c) psychological processes of elementary behavioral development, and ﬁnally to (d) advanced cognitive development.
In the present subsection, I consider three variations of
the causal determinist approach and some limitations of
each (Table 19.1).
The universalist maturationist approach makes the nativist assumption that cognitive development is an epigenetic process directed by genetic programs universal
across the human species. Genes, in this view, not only
play a role in cognitive development, but have primary
responsibility for directing its course.
The proposition that genes inﬂuence cognitive development is not controversial. Characteristics of the human
genome undoubtedly aﬀect the course of cognitive development (Karmiloﬀ-Smith, 1992; Spelke & Newport,
Ch. 6, Volume 1) and inﬂuence the nature of advanced
human cognition. A number of neo-Piagetian theories,
moreover, have suggested age-related constraints on cognitive development, perhaps due to changes related to
processing capacity (Case, Ch. 15, this Volume; Demetriou & Efklides, 1994; Demetriou et al., 1993; de Ribaupierre & Pascual-Leone, 1979; Halford, 1993; Johnson-Laird, 1990; Lamborn et al., 1994; Marini & Case,
1994). Although the explanation of such constraints is a
matter of dispute, it seems plausible that they reﬂect genetically-based maturation of the nervous system.
Even if nervous system maturation plays a role in
later cognitive development, however, there do not appear to be genetically based “critical periods” for such
development (Kuhn et al., 1995). There is a fundamental
diﬀerence, moreover, between the views that genes constrain development and that they determine its course.
There is no evidence that the structure of advanced cognition is genetically determined. Substantial individual
and cultural diﬀerences with respect to advanced cognition, in fact, are diﬃcult to reconcile with a universalist
TABLE 19.1 Theoretical Approaches to Advanced Cognitive
Development
Developmental
Paradigm
Universalist
Maturationist
Relativist
Enculturationist
Interactionist
Contextualist
Rational
Constructivist

Basis for developmental change
Genetic
determinism
Cultural
determinism
Interaction of genes
and environment
Reﬂective construction
by rational agent

Nature of developmental pathways
Psychologically
universal
Unique to
each culture
Unique to each
individual
Epistemologically
universal
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maturationist metatheory. No current theorist, to my
knowledge, proposes that advanced cognitive development is a causal process directed by the genes.
The relativist enculturationist approach suggests that
cultures diﬀer in fundamental ways with respect to
what is deemed to be advanced cognition. Changes in
advanced cognition involve the inculcation of culturally valued skills and ideas and are unique to particular
cultures. Indeed, from this perspective, there is no such
thing as advanced cognition except within the context of
a particular culture.
Culture and cognition are indeed intricately interrelated across the lifespan (Rogoﬀ, 1990, Ch. 14, this
Volume; Rogoﬀ & Chavajay, 1995). Available evidence
provides little or no support, however, for a determinist view that late cognitive changes are directly caused
by forces unique to particular cultures. Even if environmental forces do exert some degree of causal inﬂuence, moreover, there are major conceptual diﬃculties
for any suggestion that such changes constitute cognitive development.
An interactionist contextualist view would suggest that
later changes in cognition are generated by complex ongoing interactions of genetic and environmental (including cultural) factors. One would therefore expect
substantial variability in pathways of cognitive change.
Such pathways, in fact, might be largely unique to particular individuals. Again, this casts considerable doubt
on the existence of forms of cognition that are in some
general sense advanced and raises questions about what
changes in cognition, if any, are in some general sense
developmental.
Interactionist contextualism is a more plausible and
sophisticated perspective than either genetic or cultural determinism. The idea that genetic and environmental forces interact throughout the course of development, in fact, is fully consistent with a constructivist
metatheory. The conceptual and empirical problems with
construing genetic and environmental factors as causal
forces that determine developmental change, however,
are not resolved simply by recognizing the complex interactions of such factors. In particular, it is diﬃcult to
see how any causal determinist view can account for the
sort of epistemic self-understanding that marks progress
in rationality.
Rational Constructivism
A rational constructivist perspective emphasizes the active role of the developing individual in constructing
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advanced forms of cognition that transcend less adequate earlier forms. The result is an ongoing progress toward higher levels of rationality. Theorists in this tradition typically postulate developmental sequences that are
deemed to have epistemological validity across cultures.
Because the construction of advanced cognition may be
facilitated or hindered by a variety of individual and cultural factors, individual and cultural diﬀerences in the
rate and extent of progress through these idealized stages
are likely. Thus, although the stages have some degree of
epistemic universality, psychological progress through
them need not be universal.
Rational constructivism, by postulating a rational
agent, may provide a more plausible account of progress in rationality than any version of the causal determinist perspective. Without denying the importance
and interactive nature of genetic and environmental
inﬂuences, rational constructivist theories emphasize
the mediating role of the epistemic subject as an active force in its own development (R. Kitchener, 1986;
Smith, 1993).
There remains, however, the problem of accounting
for the origin of rational agency. A plausible developmental scenario is that an interaction of genetic and environmental forces produces an active biological agent,
which transforms itself into an active cognitive agent,
which increasingly constructs an ability to reﬂect on its
own cognition, thus transforming itself into a rational
agent that, to some extent, acts on the basis of its own
reasons. Thus, a causal determinist view may be helpful
in explaining the prenatal beginnings of developmental
change. A constructivist worldview, with its emphasis on
the active organism, becomes more and more relevant,
however. With further development, moreover, the process of construction becomes increasingly cognitive and
ultimately self-reﬂective, thus generating the sort of rational agent whose actions are best understood from a
rational constructivist perspective.
For a rational constructivist, then, development occurs
not as a result of genes, environment, or some interaction of the two, but as a result of active cognitive reﬂection (Berkowitz & Keller, 1994; Kitchener, 1986; Piaget,
1985; Smith, 1993). By reﬂecting on current cognition,
the thinker may reconstruct his or her own cognitions
in such a way as to render their implicit properties explicit (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Karmiloﬀ-Smith,
1992). As we have seen, for example, reﬂection on the
logical necessity implicit in one’s deductive inferences
may be central to the construction of deductive reasoning (Moshman, 1990).
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Reﬂection is an inferential process, however, and
at higher levels, is usefully construed as an act of reasoning. Rational constructivism thus directs our attention to reasoning as both a context for, and a process of,
development.
Reasoning and Development
A rational constructivist perspective suggests that reasoning is not only a product of reﬂection, but also a context for further reﬂection and thus, further development.
In the process of applying analogical relations, precedents, rules, and/or principles, one is likely to reﬂect on
one’s reasoning in such a way as to generate higher levels
of epistemic understanding and, over the long run, better reasoning.
With respect to the role of reasoning in development,
however, there is an important distinction to be made
between (a) case-based and law-based reasoning and
(b) dialectical reasoning. Although case-based and lawbased reasoning may generate reﬂection and, in time, developmental change, they are not developmental processes per se. Dialectical reasoning, on the other hand, is
usefully construed as a self-conscious form of the developmental process of reﬂection.
Consider, for example, an individual who applies a
moral principle to resolve some dilemma. If the principle is merely implicit in his or her processing of information, this would be an example of inference, but not
reasoning. If the individual understands the principle as
a principle and deliberately applies it because it is perceived as morally relevant, this would be reasoning. Provided the dilemma is adequately resolved, however, there
may be no further reﬂection on the principle.
If, however, the individual is motivated to engage in
extended reﬂection on the principle, including its justiﬁability and its relation to other principles, this may lead
to a qualitatively higher level of moral understanding
and thus constitute a developmental transition. At the
very least, we may suggest that such reﬂection involves
an implicit dialectic. To the extent that the individual
perceives diﬃculties with his or her current set of principles and intentionally coordinates and reconstructs them
for the purpose of achieving a higher level of moral understanding, we may posit a process of dialectical reﬂection that is simultaneously a process of reasoning and a
process of development.
Important developmental changes in cognition may
also be generated by extended argumentation. Argumentation may not only be a context that encourages reﬂec-
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tion, but may also enable the co-construction of a collective rationality that serves as a particularly useful object
of reﬂection. Peer discussion of a moral dilemma, for example, may generate a set of principles, including associated justiﬁcations, critiques, responses, and rejoinders,
that constitute a collective structure of moral understanding none of the participants could have generated
alone. Reﬂection on this structure may, for some of those
participants, contribute to progress in moral understanding. A variety of theorists have emphasized the epistemic
and developmental signiﬁcance of argumentation among
peers (Goldman, 1994; Habermas, 1990; Kuhn, 1991;
Moshman, 1995a, 1995b; Piaget, 1924/1972; Salmon &
Zeitz, 1995; Youniss & Damon, 1992), and there is substantial evidence for the role of peer interaction in developmental change (Dimant & Bearison, 1991; Kobayashi,
1994).
In a microgenetic study of combinatorial reasoning, for example, Dimant and Bearison (1991) had college students, over a series of six sessions, engage in incrementally more complex versions of a task in which
they had to determine what combination of chemicals
would generate a particular change in color. Some students worked on the task individually and others in dyads. All were pretested and posttested individually on a
task requiring them to systematically generate all possible combinations of ﬁve candies.
For students in the dyadic condition, each speech act
was coded using a system of categories designed to distinguish (a) collaborative engagement, in which individuals agree, disagree, ask questions, or supply explanations, from (b) speech acts not considered theoretically
relevant to cognitive development. Collaborative engagement increased over the course of the six sessions.
Pretest-posttest gains in combinatorial reasoning were
greater for (a) students in dyads with above-average levels of collaborative engagement than for (b) students in
dyads with below-average levels of collaborative engagement or (c) students who worked alone. The latter two
groups did not diﬀer, nor was there any eﬀect for theoretically irrelevant speech acts. The developmental impact of peer interaction was apparently a function of the
quality of argumentation.
In contrast to case-based and law-based reasoning,
then, dialectical reasoning—including dialectical reﬂection and argumentation—is not only a context for developmental reﬂection, but a developmental force in itself.
With the rise of dialectical forms of reasoning, the study
of reasoning becomes indistinguishable from the study
of development. Dialectical reasoning is, in fact, usefully
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construed as an eﬀort to take control of one’s cognitive
development.

TOWARD A PLURALIST RATIONAL
CONSTRUCTIVISM
This rational constructivist metatheory, I suggest, is best
able to account for the developing rationality that is central, in my view, to advanced cognitive development.
The most familiar theoretical instantiation of the rational constructivist paradigm is Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, which proposes the rational construction of structures that are general across domains and
universal across persons and cultures, culminating in formal operations as the highest stage of cognitive development. Now consider evidence for cognitive variability
that suggests a pluralist-rather than universalist-version
of rational constructivism.
It should be emphasized that pluralist rational constructivism leaves open the possibility that there may
be forms of advanced cognition that have a considerable degree of generality across cognitive domains and/
or universality across individuals and cultures. There is
substantial evidence for such generalities and universalities. Pluralist rational constructivism assumes, however,
that there are also important forms of advanced cognition speciﬁc to particular domains, individuals, and/or
cultures.
Speciﬁcity and Generality Revisited
Piaget proposed formal operations as a general structure of advanced cognition applicable to all domains of
knowledge. It is possible, however, to construe logic as
a domain and formal operations as the structure of advanced cognition within this domain, rather than as a
general stage of development. Recent theories have proposed speciﬁc forms, structures, or processes of advanced
cognition not only with respect to logic (Efklides et al.,
1994; Markovits, 1993; Moshman, 1990), but in domains
such as morality (Helwig, 1995b; Kohlberg, 1984), perspective taking (Selman, 1980), narrative interpretation
(Feldman et al., 1993), and reﬂective judgment (King &
Kitchener, 1994).
The domains potentially relevant to advanced cognitive development constitute a heterogeneous set that
overlap each other in complex ways. Even if there are
aspects of cognition speciﬁc to logic and other aspects
speciﬁc to morality, for example, logic and morality do
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not appear to be domains in the same sense. Morality,
for example, arguably involves a particular type of content, whereas logic is applicable to a variety of types of
content, including morality. Whatever the evidence for
domain speciﬁcity of cognition, it is doubtful that advanced cognitive development consists of independent
developmental transitions in some ﬁnite number of distinct domains.
As suggested earlier, it is important to avoid a simplistic choice as to whether advanced cognition is domain speciﬁc or general across domains. Rather, I proposed a focus on reasoning and distinguished four ways
in which reasoning could be speciﬁc or general.
1. There could be forms of reasoning unique to particular domains of knowledge and inference such as physical causality, biological systems, social relations, or
morality;
2. There could be forms of reasoning unique to particular types of thinking, such as problem solving, decision making, or hypothesis testing, though these types
of thinking may be applicable to multiple domains of
knowledge and inference;
3. There could be two or more distinct forms of reasoning, each of which is applicable to multiple types of
thinking and multiple domains of knowledge and inference; and
4. There could be generalities that transcend particular
forms of reasoning.
To further complicate matters, it is important to distinguish epistemological from psychological considerations with respect to speciﬁcity and generality. In comparing two domains of knowledge, for example, we must
distinguish (a) the epistemological question of whether
it is possible to identify a form of reasoning applicable
to both domains (epistemic generality) from (b) the psychological question of whether the development of that
form of reasoning is general across domains (psychological generality). Even if a given form of reasoning is
broadly applicable (epistemic generality), for instance,
the application of such reasoning in multiple domains
of knowledge may develop independently (psychological speciﬁcity). Without some conceptual basis for suggesting some sort of epistemic generality, however, psychological research on questions of generality may be
meaningless. Inquiry into questions of speciﬁcity and
generality, then, requires ongoing coordination of epistemological analysis concerning the nature and applicability of various forms of reasoning and psychological
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research concerning synchronies and asynchronies in developmental change.
A number of researchers have addressed questions of
speciﬁcity and generality with respect to reasoning about
the physical and social worlds. Marini and Case (1994),
for example, assessed levels of performance on (a) the
Piagetian balance beam task (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958)
and (b) a newly designed personality diagnosis task, requiring ability to identify abstract personality traits and
use these to predict behavior. Four levels of complexity
applicable to reasoning on both tasks were identiﬁed.
Assessing 80 individuals ranging in age from 9 to 19,
they found that most showed identical levels of performance on the two tasks, and almost all the rest diﬀered
by just one level. Without suggesting identical rates of
development in the two domains, they concluded that a
general potential for abstract reasoning typically develops about age 11 or 12 and can be observed in multiple
domains under suitable experimental conditions.
The case for psychological and developmental generality is greatly strengthened by results from microgenetic research. In one such study, Kuhn et al. (1995) presented physical and social content to fourth graders and
adults each week for a period of ten weeks. Participants
generated and tested theories in their eﬀorts to comprehend the causal relations in each domain. Developmental change in reasoning strategies was found for both age
groups and, at each age, generalized across content. The
authors concluded that both the children and the adults
were constructing reasoning strategies applicable to both
knowledge domains and were able to apply those strategies to a domain diﬀerent than the domain in which
they were constructed.
In still another approach to the generality of advanced cognition, Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, and Roedel (1995) assessed 269 college students in multiple domains with respect to both cognitive performance and
several aspects of self-monitoring. The resulting pattern of correlations suggested that monitoring competence is neither entirely general nor entirely speciﬁc to
domains. Acknowledging the importance of domainspeciﬁc knowledge, the authors concluded that monitoring within domains is in part a function of general
metacognitive processes. In sum, studies diﬀering greatly
in design and focus provide converging evidence for the
generality of advanced cognition across content. (For related research and theory, see Case, Ch. 15, this Volume;
Chandler & Boutilier, 1992; Klahr et al., 1993; Kosonen
& Winne, 1995; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1992; Nisbett
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et al., 1987; Schauble, 1996; Schommer & Walker, 1995;
Smith et al., 1992.)
Although research of this sort undercuts strong versions of domain speciﬁcity, it provides little reason to
think that advanced cognitive development can be understood as progress along a single developmental
pathway toward a general structural endpoint. I have
already proposed that case-based, law-based, and dialectical reasoning constitute distinct forms of reasoning, each of which may include two or more distinct
variants (e.g., analogical versus precedent-based forms
of case-based reasoning). It is well-established, moreover, that even young children have richly structured
domain-speciﬁc knowledge and there is substantial evidence that such domains remain important beyond
childhood (Helwig, 199513). Schauble (1996) provides
detailed examples of the many ways speciﬁc knowledge
aﬀects the reasoning people use and the conclusions
they reach. Pluralist rational constructivism does not
assume that every identiﬁable domain constitutes its
own form of rationality, thus generating its own form
of reasoning, but neither does it rule out the possibility of domain-speciﬁc forms of rationality and reasoning. The earlier discussions concerning the nature and
existence of legal and scientiﬁc reasoning illustrate the
complexity of the theoretical and empirical questions
that arise in this regard.
Whether the present analysis is seen as supportive of
domain speciﬁcity or of domain generality depends on
one’s perspective. From the standpoint of Piaget’s theory of formal operations, the present emphasis on several qualitatively distinct forms of reasoning may seem a
move toward domain speciﬁcity, with each form of reasoning potentially constituting a distinct domain of development. On the other hand, the proposed forms of
reasoning are applicable to multiple types of thinking
and multiple domains of knowledge. Analogical reasoning, for example, can be used in solving problems, making decisions, and conceptualizing relationships with respect to a wide variety of physical, biological, social, and
moral phenomena (DeLoache et al., Ch. 16, this Volume; Halford, 1992). From the standpoint of a theory
emphasizing distinct types of thinking or distinct domains of knowledge, the present approach would seem
domain general in its emphasis on broadly applicable
forms of reasoning.
Evidence for distinct forms of reasoning applicable
to multiple types of thinking and multiple domains of
knowledge and inference, then, suggests a conception of
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advanced cognitive development more pluralist than that
of Piaget, but nonetheless general in important ways. It
remains to be seen whether it will be possible to identify
speciﬁc forms of reasoning, rooted in speciﬁc forms of
rationality, that are unique and central to particular types
of thinking and/or to particular domains of knowledge
and inference.
Human Diversity and Universality
Cognitive variability may also be present or absent with
respect to various biological and/or social groupings of
individuals. Some studies, for example, have shown statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between males and females in the prevalence of various forms of advanced
cognition (Foltz et al., 1995; King & Kitchener, 1994; R.
Orr & Luszcz, 1994; Shaklee et al., 1988; Walker, 1991;
Wark & Krebs, 1996). Most theorists and researchers
conclude from such diﬀerences that, in a given culture at
a given point in its history, one gender may be somewhat
more likely than the other to show certain forms of advanced cognition, due largely to diﬀerences in the socialization and experiences of males and females in that cultural context (Baxter Magolda, 1992).
Some theorists, however, have proposed that there
are innate, fundamental, and/or essential diﬀerences between men and women such that certain developmental pathways and/or forms of advanced cognition may
be considered prototypically masculine and others prototypically feminine (Labouvie-Vief, Orwoll, & Manion,
1995). It has been suggested, for example, that women
use diﬀerent logics than men (D. Orr, 1989), that they
have diﬀerent “ways of knowing” (Belenky et al., 1986),
and that they typically construe moral issues in terms of
care, compassion and relationships, whereas men focus
on rights, justice, and autonomy (Gilligan, 1982).
Research has not supported the stronger claims of
fundamental sex diﬀerences. With respect to morality,
for example, it appears that both men and women are
capable of both care and justice reasoning; how an individual thinks depends more on the nature of the moral
dilemma than the gender of the thinker (Helwig, 1995a,
in press; Jadack, Hyde, Moore, & Keller, 1995; Walker,
1991; Wark & Krebs, 1996). Similarly, research on logical reasoning, mathematical reasoning, epistemic cognition, and argumentation generally shows sex diﬀerences to be minimal, if they are found at all (Chandler et
al., 1990; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kosonen & Winne,
1995; Kuhn, 1991; Moshman & Franks, 1986; R. Orr &
Luszcz, 1994; Shaklee et al., 1988).
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Overall, there is no evidence for any form of advanced cognition that is common among men but rare
in women, or vice versa (Menssen, 1993). Correspondingly, there is little support for theories postulating qualitatively distinct pathways of late cognitive development
for females and males. Even theorists who continue to
highlight the role of gender in advanced cognition maintain complex and ambivalent positions on the question
of sex diﬀerences (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Clinchy, 1995;
Labouvie-Vief et al., 1995).
Culture may be a more important variable than gender with respect to advanced cognitive development
(Rogoﬀ, 1990; Rogoﬀ & Chavajay, 1995). Two key questions about the relation of advanced cognition to culture
are as follows: Are there forms of advanced cognition
that are speciﬁc to particular cultures? Are there forms of
advanced cognition that are common to diverse cultures?
Each of these questions has a developmental counterpart: Are there developmental pathways speciﬁc to particular cultures? Are there developmental pathways traversed by individuals in many, and perhaps all, cultures?
The most systematic body of cross-cultural research
on advanced cognitive development derives from Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. It appears that the
moral reasoning of individuals in a wide variety of cultures can be classiﬁed and understood with respect to
Kohlberg’s stages (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Snarey, 1985).
The evidence is consistent with the view that these stages
emerge in an invariant sequence, though strong tests of
this are limited to a narrow range of cultures. There are
substantial diﬀerences both within and across cultures in
how far individuals progress.
Even within the domain of morality, however, there
is evidence that certain forms of cognition are associated with certain cultures; we cannot rule out the possibility of developmental pathways speciﬁc to particular
cultures or individuals (Campbell & Christopher, 1996;
Moshman, 1995b). Given the paucity of cross-cultural
evidence in other domains of advanced cognitive development, we must be cautious about any strong conclusions concerning the nature of human diversity and the
extent of universality. Further research is likely to reveal
both (a) forms of cognition appearing in adolescence or
adulthood that are speciﬁc to particular individuals or
cultures and (b) forms of cognition that may be deemed
advanced in a general sense and that, even if not universal across individuals, are found in suﬃciently developed individuals from a variety of cultures. Correspondingly, it continues to be a reasonable working hypothesis
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that cognitive development beyond childhood includes:
(a) progress along developmental pathways that are universal across cultures; (b) progress along pathways that
are arguably developmental but speciﬁc to particular cultures; and (c) progress along pathways that are arguably
developmental but speciﬁc to particular individuals.
With respect to universalities in advanced cognition,
for example, some plausible candidates are: (a) hypothetico-deductive reasoning; (b) principled reasoning;
(c) precedent- based reasoning; (d) deliberate coordination of theories with evidence; (e) systematic strategies
for testing hypotheses; (f ) dialectical argumentation; and
(g) rationalist conceptions of knowledge. This is not to
say such forms of advanced cognition are likely to be
found to be the predominant modes of thinking in all
adults in all cultures. On the contrary, as we have seen,
there is already substantial evidence against this. It may
turn out, however, that such forms of cognition exist in
a variety of cultures among individuals who, according to
epistemic criteria that transcend any particular culture,
may be deemed advanced in their cognition. It may also
turn out that those who achieve these or other forms of
advanced cognition do so by progressing through the
same sequence of stages, though again, the universality of the sequences may be more epistemological than
psychological.
With respect to diversities, there may be some forms
of advanced cognition speciﬁc to particular cultures or
individuals. Constitutional reasoning, for example, may
be a particular synthesis of rule-based, principled, and
precedent-based reasoning constructed only within specialized contexts in cultures with a particular kind of legal system (Fallon, 1987). In some cases, an individual
may progress through a unique series of conceptual revolutions to an advanced and novel form of understanding, as in the case of Darwin’s construction of the theory
of evolution through natural selection (Gruber, 1974).
Individuals may construct their own domains of knowledge, and such domains may vary across cultures, thus
adding another dimension to the issues of speciﬁcity
and generality discussed earlier in this section (Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Moshman, 1995b; Rybash et
al., 1986).
Universalist rational constructivism suggests that
forms of cognition speciﬁc to particular individuals and
cultures are special cases of more fundamental and universal forms of advanced cognition. This cannot be assumed in advance, however. Pluralist rational constructivism, without denying the existence and importance of
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universals, suggests that open-minded investigation of
individuals and cultures may reveal advanced and fundamental forms of cognition undreamt of in our universalist psychologies (Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Miller
& Cook-Greuter, 1994; Moshman, 1995b).
In sum, it is doubtful that late cognitive changes move
exclusively toward or through formal operations, and unclear whether they approach any other general and universal endpoint. Current research and theory suggest the
value of pluralist rational constructivism, a metatheoretical perspective within which active construction by rational agents is assumed, but generality across domains and
universality across persons and cultures are open empirical and conceptual questions.

CONCLUSION
Does cognition develop beyond childhood? As we have
seen, there is much evidence for long-term changes in
cognition beyond childhood. Early in this chapter, I proposed that long-term changes are usefully construed as
developmental if they are qualitative, progressive, and
internally directed. I anticipated that some long-term
changes in cognition beyond childhood are developmental in this sense, but that advanced cognitive development may not have other characteristics typically associated with developmental change. We now return to
these issues.
Qualitative Change
Piaget’s (1924/1972) theory of formal reasoning postulated the emergence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning at age 11 or 12. Hypothetico-deductive reasoning,
for Piaget, was not a narrow technical skill but a selfconscious coordination of logic and hypothesis—or, in
the language of Piaget (1987), of necessities and possibilities—that deﬁned a new and ﬁnal stage of cognitive
development. The later theory of formal operations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget 194711960) proposed a
logical structure central to this ﬁnal stage.
The theory of formal operations-strictly construed
as the logical model proposed by Inhelder and Piaget
(1958) no longer plays much role in the literature. A variety of neo-Piagetian theories posit the construction
of cognitive structures, variously deﬁned and characterized, and propose that such structures achieve higher
levels of abstraction beginning age 11 or 12 (Case, Ch.
15, this Volume). Other theorists, however, focus more
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on level of metacognitive reﬂection (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Kuhn, 1989, 1991; Moshman, 1990, 1994,
1995b). Although no one doubts that cognition is highly
organized, the nature and breadth of advanced cognitive
structures remains a matter of uncertainty and dispute.
I have suggested that three forms of reasoning—casebased, law-based, and dialectical—can be distinguished,
with the possibility that these can be diﬀerentiated and/
or coordinated to generate additional forms of reasoning. There is substantial evidence that some such forms
of reasoning are general across domains of knowledge
and inference (Kuhn et al., 1995; Marini & Case, 1994;
Schauble, 1996), but this does not rule out the possibility that we will identify types of thinking or forms of
reasoning speciﬁc to such domains. It appears that advanced cognition is both speciﬁc and general in multiple ways.
Although we have much to learn about matters of
speciﬁcity, generality, and structure, the case for qualitative change in cognition beyond childhood is strong. Adolescents and adults show forms of reasoning and levels
of understanding qualitatively diﬀerent from the cognition of children (Basseches, 1984; Campbell & Bickhard,
1986; Case, Ch. 15, this Volume; Chandler & Boutilier,
1992; Commons et al., 1984; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958;
King & Kitchener, 1994; Kohlberg, 1984; Kuhn, 1989;
Markovits, 1993; Moshman, 1990, 1993, 1995b; O’Brien,
1987; Overton, 1990). In fact, there is surprisingly strong
support for Piaget’s 1924 proposal that formal or hypothetico-deductive reasoning—deliberate deduction from
propositions consciously recognized as hypothetical—
plays an important role in the thinking of adolescents and
adults but is rarely seen much before the age of 11 or 12
(Markovits & Vachon, 1989; Moshman & Franks, 1986).
The stronger support for the original theory of formal
reasoning than for the structural theory of formal operations suggests that what emerges at about age 11 may not
be a better logic, but a deeper level of reﬂection about the
nature of logic, theory, and evidence (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Kuhn, 1989; Moshman, 1990).
Progressive Change
There appears to be a consensus that many of the qualitative changes in cognition beyond childhood observed
in developmental research represent progress (R. Kitchener, 1986). The consensus may be due in part to the focus of so much research on aspects of logic or mathematics where the superiority of some cognitions to others
seems clear.

Chapter : Cognitive Development beyond Childhood

The consensus may also be due in part, however, to
the narrow range of cultures represented by most theorists and research participants. Pluralist rational constructivism suggests the need for more data on advanced
cognition in multiple cultures and the corresponding
need for more epistemological analysis of what constitutes advanced cognition and how progress in cognition
can be identiﬁed in a manner that is not completely relative to culture.
The present analysis suggests ongoing transitions
that are arguably progressive in a general sense. The
emergence of thinking involves the deliberate coordination of inferences and thus represents a higher level
of intentionality and complexity. The emergence of reasoning involves increasingly explicit knowledge about
the epistemic properties of one’s inferences, thus representing a higher level of reﬂection. It remains unclear
toward what endpoints, if any, cognition tends, but
such endpoints may not be necessary to identify cognitive progress.
Reﬂective Construction
I have suggested that advanced cognition is constructed
via a process of dialectical reﬂection that coordinates
multiple cognitions and renders their implicit properties
explicit. It is in this sense that later cognitive changes,
without being genetically determined, may be said to be
internally directed and thus developmental. Pluralist rational constructivism suggests there may be forms of advanced cognition unique to individuals, forms associated
with particular cultures, and forms universal across many
or all cultures. Although some plausible universals have
been proposed, evidence relevant to questions of universality and diversity is sparse and ambiguous.
Existing research and theory are suﬃcient, however,
to suggest that advanced cognitions are not only constructed via reﬂection, but serve as a means of further
reﬂection. Such reﬂection takes place in individuals, in
groups, and in diverse cultural contexts. Our scientiﬁc
eﬀorts to understand cognition and development, moreover, are themselves reﬂective and constructive, generating theories of cognition that are themselves sophisticated forms of cognition.
It becomes increasingly diﬃcult at higher levels to
separate the application of cognition, the study of cognition, and the process of cognitive development. In both
its universal and plural aspects, cognition develops beyond childhood via reﬂective processes that are simultaneously individual, social, and rational.
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